Children's autonomy includes, as far as possible, self-determination, bodily integrity and the right to influence outcomes. Limits to bodily integrity, which involves no touching without the child's consent or tacit agreement, are discussed. The clinical, legal and ethics literature tends to agree that children may give valid consent to major recommended treatment from around 12 years but may not refuse it until they are legal adults. Research shows that young children are more aware of their bodily integrity and autonomy, of (...) morality and decision making, than was assumed in the past. Adults therefore need to inform children and respect their initially instinctive efforts to protect their bodily integrity. Unlike assent, consent involves patients being adequately informed and being able to accept or refuse proposed treatment. Reasons are given for adults’ need to consult with children when determining their best interests. Beyond words, giving or withholding consent also involves emotions of fear, trust and courage, besides embodied reactions of cooperating with treatment or resisting it, in which young children actively engage. Some clinicians work with the informed cooperation of young children who need lifesaving treatment, and at times accept their refusal. Reasons for differences between mainstream experts’ views and clinical practices are considered. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that children enjoy some form of a right to bodily integrity. However, there is little agreement about the precise nature and scope of this right. This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the child's right to bodily integrity, in order to further elucidate the relationship between the child's right to bodily integrity and considerations of autonomy. Following a discussion of Leif Wenar's work on the structure and justification of rights, I first explain how the adult's right (...) to bodily integrity can be distilled into separate elements that may plausibly be justified by different moral considerations. In particular, I claim that this analysis suggests that whilst the adult's right to bodily integrity is not wholly reducible to bodily autonomy, autonomy nonetheless remains entwined with our understanding of this right in a number of ways. On the basis of this discussion, I go on to outline three important complexities that arise when we consider the child's right to bodily integrity, before particularly focusing on the question of how third parties should determine whether or not to perform a physical interference upon a child who lacks decision-making capacity. Here, I raise some objections to Earp and Mazor's recent attempts to answer this question, before briefly defending an ‘autonomy-based interests’ account of permissible interference, an account that shares in what I take to be the spirit, if not the precise letter, of these earlier views. (shrink)

What are the ethics of child genital cutting? In a recent issue of the journal, Duivenbode and Padela (2019) called for a renewed discussion of this question. Noting that modern health care systems...

Around a third of men worldwide are circumcised. It is probably the most commonly performed surgical procedure. Circumcision is also one of the oldest forms of attempted human enhancement. It is and has been done for religious, social, aesthetic and health reasons.Circumcision has a variety of benefits and risks, many of which are discussed in this issue. There is some dispute about the magnitude and likelihood of these benefits and risks. Some argue that the risks outweigh the benefits and circumcision (...) should not be performed on children who are not competent to make their own decisions.If the risks of circumcision clearly outweighed the benefits, great harm has been done and is being done globally through this procedure. Around a third of all men would have been harmed. This is an extraordinary public health injury. Presumably, many would be entitled to compensation.The fact that relatively few people think that the situation is as bad as this indicates that most people implicitly believe that circumcision is not generally a significant harm, if a harm at all. One might thus conclude either that: It is not clear from existing evidence whether the risks of properly performed circumcision outweigh the benefits, or vice versa.Or 2. If circumcision is against the interests of an infant or young child, it is only mildly so.In general, people should make their own decisions about body modification and human enhancement when this is possible. Such an approach speaks in favour of waiting until a child becomes an adult to make his or her own decision about circumcision. And procedures which are not clearly in a child's interests should not be performed on that child. However, religious …. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of the recently revised BMA guidance on routine neonatal male circumcision and seeks to challenge the assumptions underpinning the guidance which construe this procedure as a matter of parental choice. Our aim is to problematise continued professional willingness to tolerate the non-therapeutic, non-consensual excision of healthy tissue, arguing that in this context both professional guidance and law are uncharacteristically tolerant of risks inflicted on young children, given the absence of clear medical benefits. By interrogating historical (...) medical explanations for this practice, which continue to surface in contemporary justifications of non-consensual male circumcision, we demonstrate how circumcision has long existed as a procedure in need of a justification. We conclude that it is ethically inappropriate to subject children—male or female—to the acknowledged risks of circumcision and contend that there is no compelling legal authority for the common view that male circumcision is lawful. (shrink)

This article considers two competing types of conceptions of the pre-autonomous child’s right to bodily integrity. The first, which I call encroachment conceptions, holds that any physically serious bodily encroachment infringes on the child’s right to bodily integrity. The second, which I call best-interests conceptions, holds that the child’s right to bodily integrity is infringed just in case the child is subjected to a bodily encroachment that substantially deviates from what is in the child’s best interests. I argue in this (...) article that best-interests conceptions are more plausible than encroachment conceptions. They have more attractive implications regarding the permissibility of interventions in children’s bodies that are beneficial for the child but are not medically necessary. They are better able to explain the moral distinction between cases in which an encroachment on a child’s body is needed to benefit that child and cases in which an encroachment on one child’s body is needed to benefit another. Finally, best-interests conceptions are more consonant than encroachment conceptions with our understanding of adults’ right to bodily integrity. (shrink)

When is it ethically permissible for clinicians to surgically intervene into the genitals of a legal minor? We distinguish between voluntary and nonvoluntary procedures and focus on nonvoluntary procedures, specifically in prepubescent minors (“children”). We do not address procedures in adolescence or adulthood. With respect to children categorized as female at birth who have no apparent differences of sex development (i.e., non-intersex or “endosex” females) there is a near-universal ethical consensus in the Global North. This consensus holds that clinicians may (...) not perform any nonvoluntary genital cutting or surgery, from “cosmetic” labiaplasty to medicalized ritual “pricking” of the vulva, insofar as the procedure is not strictly necessary to protect the child’s physical health. All other motivations, including possible psychosocial, cultural, subjective-aesthetic, or prophylactic benefits as judged by doctors or parents, are seen as categorically inappropriate grounds for a clinician to proceed with a nonvoluntary genital procedure in this population. We argue that the main ethical reasons capable of supporting this consensus turn not on empirically contestable benefit–risk calculations, but on a fundamental concern to respect the child’s privacy, bodily integrity, developing sexual boundaries, and (future) genital autonomy. We show that these ethical reasons are sound. However, as we argue, they do not only apply to endosex female children, but rather to all children regardless of sex characteristics, including those with intersex traits and endosex males. We conclude, therefore, that as a matter of justice, inclusivity, and gender equality in medical-ethical policy (we do not take a position as to criminal law), clinicians should not be permitted to perform any nonvoluntary genital cutting or surgery in prepubescent minors, irrespective of the latter’s sex traits or gender assignment, unless urgently necessary to protect their physical health. By contrast, we suggest that voluntary surgeries in older individuals might, under certain conditions, permissibly be performed for a wider range of reasons, including reasons of self-identity or psychosocial well-being, in keeping with the circumstances, values, and explicit needs and preferences of the persons so concerned. Note: Because our position is tied to clinicians’ widely accepted role-specific duties as medical practitioners within regulated healthcare systems, we do not consider genital procedures performed outside of a healthcare context (e.g., for religious reasons) or by persons other than licensed healthcare providers working in their professional capacity. (shrink)

Female genital cutting (FGC) is generally understood as a gendered harm, abusive cultural practice and human rights violation. By contrast, male genital cutting (MGC) is held to be minimally invasive, an expression of religious identity and a legitimate parental choice. Yet scholars increasingly problematize this dichotomy, arguing that male and female genital cutting can occasion comparable levels of harm. In 2015 this academic critique received judicial endorsement, with Sir James Munby's acknowledgement that all genital cutting can cause ‘significant harm’. This (...) article investigates the harm occasioned by MGC. It is informed by a Freedom of Information (FoI) study which provides some empirical evidence of the nature and frequency of physical harm caused by MGC in U.K. hospitals. While acknowledging the challenges and limitations of FoI research, we outline important lessons that this preliminary study contains for medical ethics, law and policy. It provides some empirical evidence to support claims regarding the risks which accompany the procedure and the obligation of health professionals to disclose them, and reveals the paucity of measures in place to ensure that harms are recorded, disclosed and monitored. (shrink)

This article presents the first empirically-based and theoretically-informed investigation of the effectiveness of the ‘self-declaration model’ of legal gender recognition in Denmark, the first European state to adopt it. Drawing upon analysis of legislative materials, as well as interviews with stakeholders in the legislative process and trans and intersex legal subjects, it contends that self-declaration is not without its limitations. By conceptualising embodiment as an ontological and epistemological process of becoming, and emphasising the institutional dimensions and effects of such processes, (...) it demonstrates that self-declaration may not address the complexities of legal embodiment, particularly concerning restrictions on trans and intersex people’s access to health care. The article’s empirical findings are directed towards the policymakers and activists tasked with shaping reforms of gender recognition legislation in the UK and elsewhere. The analytical agenda it develops may be adopted, and adapted, by scholars working in this area and other regulatory contexts. (shrink)

The principle of the child's right to an open future was first proposed by the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg and developed further by bioethicist Dena Davis. The principle holds that children possess a unique class of rights called rights in trust—rights that they cannot yet exercise, but which they will be able to exercise when they reach maturity. Parents should not, therefore, take actions that permanently foreclose on or pre-empt the future options of their children, but leave them the greatest (...) possible scope for exercising personal life choices in adulthood. Davis particularly applies the principle to genetic counselling, arguing that parents should not take deliberate steps to create physically abnormal children, and to religion, arguing that while parents are entitled to bring their children up in accordance with their own values, they are not entitled to inflict physical or mental harm, neither by omission nor commission. In this paper, I aim to elucidate the open future principle, and consider whether it is applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision of boys, whether performed for cultural/religious or for prophylactic/health reasons. I argue that the principle is highly applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision, and conclude that non-therapeutic circumcision would be a violation of the child's right to an open future, and thus objectionable from both an ethical and a human rights perspective. (shrink)

1. Aim of the guidelines2. Principles of good practice3. Circumcision for medical purposes4. Non-therapeutic circumcision 4.1. The law 4.1.1. Summary: the law 4.2. Consent and refusal 4.2.1. Children’s own consent 4.2.2. Parents’ consent 4.2.3. Summary: consent and refusal 4.3. Best interests 4.3.1. Summary: best interests 4.4. Health issues 4.5. Standards 4.6. Facilities 4.7. Charging patients 4.8. Conscientious objection5. Useful addresses.