- Maximality, Function, and the Many.Robert Francescotti - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):175-193.details
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Conjoined twinning & biological individuation.Alexandria Boyle - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2395-2415.details
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Human Persistence.Rory Madden - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.details
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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.details
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Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.details
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Against the Maximality Principle.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):381-390.details
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Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.details
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(1 other version)Human beings revisited: My body is not an animal.Mark Johnston - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:33-74.details
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(1 other version)Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.details
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Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning.Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.details
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Was Jekyll Hyde?Eric T. Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.details
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The Problem of the Many.Peter Unger - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.details
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(1 other version)Persons, animals, and ourselves.Paul F. Snowdon - 1990 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the human mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The brain and somatic integration: Insights into the standard biological rationale for equating brain death with death.D. Alan Shewmon - 2001 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (5):457 – 478.details
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Dion and theon: An essentialist solution to an ancient puzzle.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):129-139.details
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What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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What Does it Mean to Say That We Are Animals?E. T. Olson - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):84-107.details
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The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.details
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Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In João Fonseca & Jorge Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. New York: Peter Lang. pp. 21-40.details
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The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia.details
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The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):24-40.details
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The organism view defended.S. Matthew Liao - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):334-350.details
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Animalism, dicephalus, and borderline cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.details
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Persons as proper parts of organisms.David B. Hershenov - 2005 - Theoria 71 (1):29-37.details
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Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.details
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Death, Brain Death, and Persistent Vegetative State.Jeff McMahan - 1998 - In Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics. Malden, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 286–298.details
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Countering the appeal of the psychological approach to personal identity.David Hershenov - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):447-474.details
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