The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in (...) German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

The demand for a concept—for a definition specifying what one means by a term (or, for a thing, what it actually consists of)—is a classical requirement of philosophy. As a rule, however, this demand can scarcely be satisfied, and there are good reasons for not wanting to satisfy it. For a definition is always a way of fixing something, and a concept is an intervention in the manifold diversity of things and phenomena that freezes them. The defense of the diversity (...) of the particular and, to speak with Adorno, of the nonidentical is also an aim of phenomenology. The demand for a concept and the preservation of phenomena therefore appear to be in conflict with one another. The idea of formulating a concept .. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the relationship between humans and nature and the implied intimacy, so-call ‘ecophilia,’ in light of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It is revealed from the Merleau-Pontian view of body and nature that there may be a more harmonious relationship between humankind and nature than the commonly assumed, and an alternative understanding of education may thus arise. Following an introduction, this paper falls into three parts: an exploration of the meaning of nature, the corporeality of the (...) body as central to our encounter with nature and the educational implications. The introduction argues that central to one’s understanding of nature is one’s understanding of oneself and the world. To some extent, our current environmental problems are related to a negative understanding of nature. The meaning of nature and our relationship with it will be elaborated by the exploration of the key significance of body to be found in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. It will be argued that overall, our understanding of the body may be central to reconnecting humankind and nature. Such a re-conceiving of the part played by the body in our relationship with nature may re-orient education towards a love of nature: ecophilia. (shrink)

In this article I consider contemporary philosophical conceptions of human nature from the point of view of the ideal of gender equality. My main argument is that an essentialist account of human nature, unlike what I take to be its two main alternatives (the subjectivist account and the cultural account), is able coherently to justify the educational pursuit of this ideal. By essentialism I refer to the idea that there are some features common to all human beings (independent of individual, (...) cultural and historical factors) that are conducive to a good life and human flourishing. I also consider the main philosophical challenge of essentialism, the naturalistic fallacy, and the ways in which contemporary versions of essentialism might escape this charge. (shrink)

F N Dunlop; Education and Human Nature, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 4, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 21–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.197.

The entity in this book is neither soul nor body. It is that which has been forgotten since Greek classicism, that which can be perceived without the help of sight or touch, in shock, in - for example - fear, pain, hunger, thirst, revulsion, lust, rapture, freshness, tiredness, when feelings of affect are awakened, in sensations of movement, in the direction of gaze. Using new concepts dealing with expansion and dynamics, this forgotten entity is brought out of the shadows and (...) examined with the aid of examples. This work examines the role of the "Leib," according to its meaning, in the structure of the individual person, in the feeling of feelings, in art, history, space, time, soul, body. The book ends with a sketch of the different ways in whichthe "Leib"has been addressed, from the ideas of Homer up to the present.". (shrink)

This paper begins with the assumption that the differences among women pose a threat to building a unified feminist theory and practice. Utilizing the work and methods of Michel Foucault, I explore theoretical and practical implications of taking difference seriously. I claim that a politics of difference puts into question the concept of a revolutionary subject and the idea of a social totality. In the final section a brief Foucauldian analysis of the feminist sexuality debates is given.

Francis Dunlop; The Rational-Liberal Neglect of Human Nature, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–119, https://doi.or.

Although the idea of nature has allbut disappeared from recent discussion ofeducation, it remains highly relevant to thephilosophy and practice of education, sincetacit notions of human nature and whatconstitutes underlying reality – the `natural'order of things – necessarily orientateseducation in fundamental ways. It is arguedthat underlying our various senses of nature isthe idea of nature as the `self-arising' whoseintrinsic integrity, mystery and valueimplicitly condition our understanding ofourselves and of the reality in which we live.I argue that the acknowledgement of nature (...) soconceived opens up a perspective on educationthat requires us to review currently dominanttechnological notions of truth and knowledge,and also of what should characterize theprocess of education, reasserting the properplace of more intuitive, local and dialogicalknowledge and relationships. (shrink)