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  1. (1 other version)The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
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  • Direct perception in the intersubjective context.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543.
    This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory and simulation theory , both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct (...)
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  • Animal Signals: Mind-Reading and Manipulation.John R. Krebs & Richard Dawkins - 1984 - In John R. Krebs & Nicholas B. Davies, Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (2nd Edition). Blackwell. pp. 380–402.
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  • The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  • Tactical deception in primates.A. Whiten & R. W. Byrne - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):233-244.
    Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify (...)
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  • The evolution and psychology of self-deception.William von Hippel & Robert Trivers - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):1.
    In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. (...)
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  • Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding (...)
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  • An Evolutionary Perspective on Testimony and Argumentation.Dan Sperber - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):401-413.
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  • Redefining animal signaling: influence versus information in communication.Michael J. Ryan - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (5):755-780.
    Researchers typically define animal signaling as morphology or behavior specialized for transmitting encoded information from a signaler to a perceiver. Although intuitively appealing, this conception is inherently metaphorical and leaves concepts of both information and encoding undefined. To justify relying on the information construct, theorists often appeal to Shannon and Weaver’s quantitative definition. The two approaches are, however, fundamentally at odds. The predominant definition of animal signaling is thus untenable, which has a number of undesirable consequences for both theory and (...)
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  • (7) law and causality.Frank Ramsey - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin, Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. pp. 140-163.
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  • Signals, Icons, and Beliefs.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2012 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford, Millikan and her critics. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 41–62.
    This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Senders and Receivers Content States of the Mind and Brain.
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  • Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):1-13.
    This article considers the product of self-deception. Many assume, or argue, that the product of self-deception is a belief. I argue against this being a general truth by outlining some of the ways in which the self-deceived can be deeply conflicted, such that there is no fact of the matter concerning what they believe. These situations are not adequately addressed by many accounts of self-deception. Further, I argue that this task requires going beyond our folk psychological classifications.
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  • Stephen P Stich: The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. [REVIEW]E. J. Lowe - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):98.
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  • Representation and Truthlikeness.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (4):375-379.
    Woosuk Park’s paper “Misrepresentation in Context” is a useful plea for a theory of representation with promising interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that such a unified account is provided by Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics. This theory puts Park’s criticism of Nelson Goodman and Jerry Fodor in context. Some of Park’s pertinent remarks on the problem of misrepresentation can be illuminated by the account of truthlikeness and idealization developed by philosophers of science.
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  • (1 other version)Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.
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