Many philosophers have defended the view that well‐off people or nations have an obligation to assist people who suffer from famine in less developed areas of the world. However, in contrast to this outlook, some theorists have claimed that it is ethically wrong to provide this kind of assistance. In this article the non‐assistance view is discussed. It is argued that even if a neo‐Malthusian population theory is correct and if we accept a maximizing policy which allows the relevant weighing (...) of evils, there may still be an obligation to assist the victims of starvation in poor countries. (shrink)

There is a special problem with respect to our obligations to future generations which is that we can benefit or harm them but that they cannot benefit or harm us. Goodin summarizes the point well:No analysis of intergenerational justice that is cast even vaguely in terms of reciprocity can hope to succeed. The reason is the one which Addison… puts into the mouth of an Old Fellow of College, who when he was pressed by the Society to come into something (...) that might rebound to the good of their Successors, grew very peevish. ‘We are always doing’ says he, ‘something for Posterity, but I would fain see Posterity do something for us’. (shrink)

This two-part article is a detailed examination of the problem of the commons in environmental ethics. According to Garrett Hardin, the logic of the commons requires a policy of "triage" concerning aid to the non-industrialized world. Griffin attacks this view on both a theoretical and a factual level: Hardin's logic is incapable of proving the superiority of rational egoism; and the facts of third world development and production do not fit the model of medical triage.