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  1. Koine Aisthesis.D. W. Hamlyn - 1968 - The Monist 52 (2):195-209.
    The phrase koine aisthesis appears, as far as I can see, very rarely in Aristotle. There is one definite use of the phrase in the De Anima, at 425a27. The word koine without aisthesis but such that the latter must be supplied may possibly occur at 431b5, but the text is uncertain there, and there is every reason why the word should be deleted from the text. This leaves us with a single occurrence of the phrase koine aisthesis in the (...)
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  • Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition: From Alcmaeon to Aristotle.John I. Beare - 1906 - Oxford,: Martino.
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  • Aristotle on demarcating the five senses.Richard Sorabji - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (1):55-79.
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  • (1 other version)Aristotle on sense perception.Thomas J. Slakey - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (4):470-484.
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  • Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology.Charles H. Kahn - 1966 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1-3):43-81.
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  • Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception.Stanford Cashdollar - 1973 - Phronesis 18 (1):156-175.
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  • Truth and error in Aristotle's theory of sense perception.Irving Block - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (42):1-9.
    Why does aristotle say that the common sensibles are susceptible to error while the specific sensibles are not? various solutions of this problem are discussed and finally it is concluded that aristotle's meaning here is teleological. The specific senses were fashioned by nature to perceive the specific sensibles but not the common sensibles and so error sometimes (often) creeps in. The common sense is really not a sense faculty as the eye, The ear etc.
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  • Aristotle and the physical object.Irving Block - 1960 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (1):93-101.
    HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THE PERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS, ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACE THIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACT AFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT BY (...)
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