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Written before his better-known philosophical works, these essays fully explain how natural law is known and to what extent it is binding. |
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This paper argues that Locke has a representative theory of sensitive knowledge. Perceivers are immediately aware of nothing but sensory ideas in the mind; yet perceivers think of real external substances that correspond to and cause those ideas, and they are warranted in believing that those substances exist (at that time). The theory poses two questions: what warrants the truth of such beliefs? What is it in virtue of which sensory ideas represent external objects and how do they make perceivers (...) |
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It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistent epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that (physical) objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We (...) |
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Why does aristotle say that the common sensibles are susceptible to error while the specific sensibles are not? various solutions of this problem are discussed and finally it is concluded that aristotle's meaning here is teleological. The specific senses were fashioned by nature to perceive the specific sensibles but not the common sensibles and so error sometimes (often) creeps in. The common sense is really not a sense faculty as the eye, The ear etc. |
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Locke wrote Draft A of the Essay while collaborating with physician Thomas Sydenham. Sydenham held that we are ignorant of nature's internal workings, cannot decide which natural philosophical theories are true and should therefore rely only upon experience. Draft A repeated Sydenham's views — we cannot understand nature's modus operandi and must rely on experience for our knowledge of the world. Equally, we must be agnostic about natural philosophical theories, mechanism included. Locke was not a mechanist in Draft A. Consequently, (...) |
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