In When Clinical Trials Compete: Prioritizing Study Recruitment, Gelinas et al tackle an important issue—study non-completion—and draw conclusions with which we largely agree. Most importantly, we accept that setting priorities among competing research studies is necessary and should be informed by ethical analysis. We disagree with the conclusion of Gelinas et al that this priority setting should take place at the level of the individual research institution. At a minimum, they should consider other actors who might be better suited for (...) this role instead of—or alongside—the institutions that host research. Our view is motivated by three main considerations. First, research institutions have significant latitude to promote their own interests, and there is reason to suspect that their interests do not closely align with the interests of the public. Thus, asking research institutions to set research priorities may result in the selection of studies with suboptimal social value. Second, a large proportion of clinical trials recruits participants at multiple institutions.1 If each institution sets its own priorities, we can expect discrepancies between the priorities set by partner institutions. These discrepancies may delay and discourage collaborative research projects. Finally, we suspect that a great deal of recruitment competition occurs between, rather than within, research institutions. Setting priorities only at …. (shrink)

The volume of clinical research is increasing exponentially—far beyond our ability to process and absorb the results. Given this situation, it may be beneficial to consider reducing the flow at its source. In what follows, I will motivate and critically evaluate the following proposal: researchers should conduct fewer clinical trials. More specifically, I c onsider whether researchers should be permitted to conduct only clinical research of very high quality and, in turn, whether research ethics committees should prohibit all other, lower-quality (...) research, even when it might appear to meet some minimal ethical standard. Following a close analysis of the social-value requirement of ethical clinical research, I argue that this proposal is defensible. The problem identified in this paper has two parts, quantity and quality, and some clarification is needed about the latter because “quality” is a highly contested term in the medical literature. When some scholars advocate for high-quality trials, they mean large-scale, simple, explanatory randomized controlled trials. Others, including myself, have defended a different characterization of high-quality research that tends more toward pragmatic trial design and the use of methods other than RCTs. Pragmatic trials aim to provide evidence that directly supports clinical decision-making in “usual” care settings. Unlike explanatory trials, which aim to abstract away from particular settings and patients, in the hopes of creating ideal conditions for the success of an intervention, pragmatic trials deliberately pursue knowledge of high applicability, through the use of representative subjects, clinically important questions, flexible treatment protocols, patient-oriented outcome measures, and so on. I see applicability as a marker of high-quality research. The context in which research is meant to be applied should be the context in which new interventions are evaluated. (shrink)

In their essay, ‘When Clinical Trials Compete: Prioritizing Study Recruitment’, Gelinas et al describe a collective action problem that can arise if multiple trials at a single institution are all trying to recruit participants from the same patient population. Each trial may be addressing an important question, and each will need a certain number of participants to provide an informative answer. But because these trials are all recruiting from the same population, it is possible that there will not be enough (...) participants to go around. It may turn out, then, that none successfully achieves its target sample size and all end up being uninformative or less informative than hoped. As Gelinas et al observe, these kinds of uninformative or less-informative trials are ethically problematic, since they fail to fully redeem participant risks and burdens with adequate gains in generalisable knowledge. Such trials also represent wasteful or inefficient research activities, since each necessarily has a human and material cost, but then fails to offset these costs by providing a definitive answer to the research …. (shrink)