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  1. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2004 - MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  • Words.David Kaplan - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):93-119.
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  • Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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  • Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  • Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):447 - 457.
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  • Images of identity: In search of modes of presentation.RG Millikan - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):499-519.
    There are many alternative ways that a mind or brain might represent that two of its representations were of the same object or property, the 'Strawson' model, the 'duplicates' model, the 'synchrony' mode, the 'Christmas lights' model, the 'anaphor' model, and so forth. I first discuss what would constitute that a mind or brain was using one of these systems of identity marking rather than another. I then discuss devastating effects that adopting the Strawson model has on the notion that (...)
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  • The Transparency of Mental Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.
    I believe that the notion of epistemic transparency does play an important role in our ordinary conception of mental content and I want to say what that role is. Unfortunately, the task is a large one; here I am able only to begin on its outline. I shall proceed somewhat indirectly, beginning with a discussion of externalist conceptions of mental content. I shall show that such conceptions violate epistemic transparency to an extent that has not been fully appreciated. Subsequently, I (...)
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  • Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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  • Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
    A transcript of three lectures, given at Princeton University in 1970, which deals with (inter alia) debates concerning proper names in the philosophy of language.
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  • Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand it After 25 Years?Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45-110.
    The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...)
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  • In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
    _Naming and Necessity_ has had a great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is (...)
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  • Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.
    According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic – the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining (...)
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  • Externalism and inference.Paul A. Boghossian - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:11-28.
    The question I want to look at in this paper is this: To what extent does an externalist conception of mental content threaten our ability to know the contents of our thoughts? I shall argue that, in an important sense, externalism is inconsistent with the thesis that we have authoritative first-person knowledge of thought content: in particular, I shall argue, it is inconsistent with the thesis that our thought contents are epistemically transparent to us. I shall further argue that this (...)
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  • On mentalese orthography.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  • (3 other versions)Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
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  • Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
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  • Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance.Mikkel Gerken - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge.Joseph L. Camp - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can (...)
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  • Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology.Tyler Burge - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.
    This essay is a long one. It is not meant to be read in a single sitting. Its structure is as follows. In section I, I explicate perceptual anti-individualism. Section II centers on the two aspects of the representational content of perceptual states. Sections III and IV concern the nature of the empirical psychology of vision, and its bearing on the individuation of perceptual states. Section V shows how what is known from empirical psychology undermines disjunctivism and hence certain further (...)
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  • A false dilemma for anti-individualism.Mikkel Gerken - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
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  • Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan (Innovations in Philosophy).
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  • Is sense transparent?John Campbell - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
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  • (1 other version)Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes.Tyler Burge - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 246--324.
    I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and representational relation to a particular referent in perception or thought. I will not dress this bare statement here. The fifth thesis tries to be less coarse. The first four explicate and restrict context- bound, singular, empirical representation, which constitutes a significant and central type of de re state or attitude.
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  • (1 other version)Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
    Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 91–116, ht.
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  • New paradigm psychology of reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.
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  • Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasoning are fallible, and that the attitudes operative in reasoning are anti-individualistically individuated. Indeed, my discussion will amount to (...)
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  • A notional worlds approach to confusion.Krista Lawlor - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172.
    People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our (...)
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  • Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Robert Stalnaker opposes the traditional view that knowledge of one's own current thoughts and feelings is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. He argues that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feelings only by viewing ourselves from the outside, by seeing our inner lives as features of the world as it is in itself.
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  • Confused thought and modes of presentation.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36.
    Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought (...)
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  • Précis of Confusion* 1.Joseph L. Camp - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):692-699.
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  • Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):677-679.
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  • (1 other version)Five theses on De Re States and attitudes.Tyler Burge - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts.Krista Lawlor - 2001 - New York: Routledge.
    This book defends a novel theory of singular concepts, emphasizing the pragmatic requirements of singular concept possession and arguing that these requirements must be understood to institute traditions and policies of thought.
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