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  1. (1 other version)The Taming of the True.Michael Glanzberg & Neil Tennant - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290.
    The Taming of the True continues the project Neil Tennant began in Anti-realism and Logic of investigating and defending anti-realism. Tennant’s earlier book anticipated a second volume, in which issues related to empirical discourse would be addressed in greater detail. The Taming of the True provides this sequel. It also attempts a ground-clearing project, by addressing challenges to some of the presuppositions and implications of Tennant’s anti-realist position. Finally, it takes an opportunity to revisit some of the issues examined in (...)
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  • Intuitionism Disproved?Timothy Williamson - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):203--7.
    Perennial philosophers' hopes are unlikely victims of swift, natural deduction. Yet anti-realism has been thought one. Not hoping for anti-realism myself I here show it, lest it be underestimated, to survive the following argument, adapted from W. D.Hart pp. 156, 164-5; he credits first publication to Fitch).
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  • (1 other version)The Epistemology of Abstract Objects.David Bell & W. D. Hart - 1979 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 53 (1):135-166.
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  • Fitch back in action again?S. Rosenkranz - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):67-71.
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  • (1 other version)Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143–150.
    Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the right-hand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Principia Mathematica.A. N. Whitehead & B. Russell - 1927 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 2 (1):73-75.
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  • .Joe Salerno - 2008 - In New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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