Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1513 citations  
  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   980 citations  
  • Content, context, and explanation.Dennis W. Stampe - 1990 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation.Dennis W. Stampe - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):42-63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   226 citations  
  • Semantics, wisconsin style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • Review of P sychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   647 citations  
  • (1 other version)The epistemology of belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations