Recent research has linked the reduction of abnormal accruals to corporate governance metrics. The results of these studies, however, are based on samples taken from periods prior to promulgated board independence requirements. In other words, during this time period, management not only had discretion over accounting accruals, but also significant influence over the choice of membership on the board of directors. This study suggests that ethical management practices may be a correlated omitted variable in these studies, thus resulting in causal (...) inference problems in the previous research. We argue that, rather than the board of directors monitoring and reducing abnormal accruals as has been posited, management who was not engaging in abusive earnings management was attempting to signal the market regarding the quality of the firm’s financial information through its choice of board membership. (shrink)

This paper discusses corporate governance issues from a compliance viewpoint. It makes a distinction between legal and ethical compliance mechanisms and shows that the former has clearly proven to be inadequate as it lacks the moral firepower to restore confidence and the ability to build trust. The concepts of freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence provide a theoretical basis for explaining why legal compliance mechanisms are insufficient in dealing with fraudulent practices and may not be addressing the real and (...) fundamental issues that inspire ethical behavior. The tendency to overemphasize legal compliance mechanisms may result in an attempt to substitute accountability for responsibility and may also result in an attempt to legislate morality which consequently leads to legal absolutism. The current environment of failures of corporate responsibility are not only failures of legal compliance, but more fundamentally failures to do the right (ethical) thing. (shrink)

This paper reports on the results of an experiment conducted with experienced corporate directors. The study findings indicate that directors employ prospective rationality cognition, and they sometimes make decisions that emphasize legal defensibility at the expense of personal ethics and social responsibility. Directors recognize the ethical and social implications of their decisions, but they believe that current corporate law requires them to pursue legal courses of action that maximize shareholder value. The results suggest that additional ethics education will have little (...) influence on the decisions of many business leaders because their decisions are driven by corporate law, rather than personal ethics. (shrink)

Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm''s activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms'' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between (...) ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm''s ethics program and potential conflicts of interest. (shrink)

While much has been written on specificity (e.g., in texts on new institutional economics, agency theory, and team production theory), there are still some insights to be learnt by business ethicists. This article approaches the issue from the perspective of team production, and will propose a new form of corporate governance: enlightened corporate governance, which takes into consideration the specific investments of employees. The article argues that, in addition to shareholders, employees also bear a residual risk which arises due to (...) their specific investments. This residual risk presents a valid and legitimate basis for residual claims. In this way, employees can be seen as residual claimants due to the fact that their income depends upon a hazardous quasi rent. Therefore, this article will call on the fiduciary duty of board members to protect those employees who are exposed to such residual risks and may thus be vulnerable as a result. This leads to a fundamental change of perspective on the “theory of the firm” – a change which will adopt the theories of new institutional economics, agency theory, and team production theory in order to promote business ethics research. Against this background, enlightened corporate governance aims to follow the criterion of specific investments as a legitimate basis for residual claims. Furthermore, it seeks to understand the consequences for board members, and to promote the sharing of control and ownership. The article will close with some discussion of the implications and future prospects for business ethics. (shrink)