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  1. True lies: Self-stabilization without self-deception☆.Werner Greve & Dirk Wentura - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):721-730.
    Self-deception entails apparent conceptual paradoxes and poses the dilemma between two competing needs: the need for stability of the self-concept, on the one hand, and the need to accept reality, on the other. It is argued, first, that conceptual difficulties can be avoided by distinguishing two levels of explanation. Whereas, in a personal language, “the person” deceives him- or her-self, a cognitive approach explains this self-deception by reference to the interplay of cognitive processes of which the person is not aware. (...)
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