Unlike basic sciences, scientific research in advanced technologies aims to explain, predict, and (mathematically) describe not phenomena in nature, but phenomena in technological artefacts, thereby producing knowledge that is utilized in technological design. This article first explains why the covering-law view of applying science is inadequate for characterizing this research practice. Instead, the covering-law approach and causal explanation are integrated in this practice. Ludwig Prandtl's approach to concrete fluid flows is used as an example of scientific research in the engineering (...) sciences. A methodology of distinguishing between regions in space and/or phases in time that show distinct physical behaviours is specific to this research practice. Accordingly, two types of models specific to the engineering sciences are introduced. The diagrammatic model represents the causal explanation of physical behaviour in distinct spatial regions or time phases; the nomo-mathematical model represents the phenomenon in terms of a set of mathematically formulated laws. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior (...) of these systems. In many instances, these computer simulations are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of transformation has its own epistemology. I also argue that this kind of epistemology is unfamiliar to most philosophy of science, which has traditionally concerned itself with the justification of theories, not with their application. Finally, I urge that the nature of this epistemology suggests that the end results of some simulations do not bear a simple, straightforward relation to the theories from which they stem. (shrink)

A number of recent discussions comparing computer simulation and traditional experimentation have focused on the significance of “materiality.” I challenge several claims emerging from this work and suggest that computer simulation studies are material experiments in a straightforward sense. After discussing some of the implications of this material status for the epistemology of computer simulation, I consider the extent to which materiality (in a particular sense) is important when it comes to making justified inferences about target systems on the basis (...) of experimental results. (shrink)

The goal of the present article is to contribute to the epistemology and methodology of computer simulations. The central thesis is that the process of simulation modeling takes the form of an explorative cooperation between experimenting and modeling. This characteristic mode of modeling turns simulations into autonomous mediators in a specific way; namely, it makes it possible for the phenomena and the data to exert a direct influence on the model. The argumentation will be illustrated by a case study of (...) the general circulation models of meteorology, the major simulation models in climate research. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the sorts of arguments that motivate skepticism about the predictive powers of global climate models. I contend that these arguments work by contrasting the development and testing of global climate models with an idealized image of science drawn largely from a theologized model of fundamental physics. A richer appreciation of the methodology of a full range of successful empirical predictions—particularly in practical fields that study complex systems––can dispel some of these skeptical worries about climate science. (...) If this is right, the good company into which climate science will have been drawn may help to save it from contemptuous ill-treatment at the hands of a theologized image of physics. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between simulation and experiment. Many discussions of simulation, and indeed the term "numerical experiments," invoke a strong metaphor of experimentation. On the other hand, many simulations begin as attempts to apply scientific theories. This has lead many to characterize simulation as lying between theory and experiment. The aim of the paper is to try to reconcile these two points of viewto understand what methodological and epistemological features simulation has in common with experimentation, while at the (...) same time keeping a keen eye on simulation's ancestry as a form of scientific theorizing. In so doing, it seeks to apply some of the insights of recent work on the philosophy of experiment to an aspect of theorizing that is of growing philosophical interest: the construction of local models. (shrink)

This thesis is an examination of claims about the risk of global catastrophe. I present examples of models of global systems that predict catastrophe, if certain conditions prevail, and I explain their goals as well as give some of their history. I present arguments concerning the conditions of a good prediction, and arguments concerning the predictive weakness of ecological models, to conclude that models of global systems generating predictions of catastrophe leave us uncertain as to the likelihood of catastrophe. ;Next, (...) I examine the problem of action in the face of this uncertainty. There are those who argue that policy-makers should not react to scenarios of catastrophe until the evidence for them is strong. On the other hand, there are those who adopt the 'precautionary principle', which advises that lack of scientific evidence for a claim should not be taken as a reason for exercising a lack of caution when the risk is high. ;Some authors have argued that if normal canons of rationality cannot recommend maximum caution, then we should adopt a rival rationality that emphasizes democratic and ethical values. I will critique this view and reject it for its failure to distinguish properly between epistemic values and action-guiding values. ;Other authors argue for the precautionary principle on the grounds that we have an ethical obligation to avoid catastrophe, whatever the practical costs. There are, as well, purely prudential reasons in favour of the precautionary principle. Using arguments parallel to those of Blaise Pascal and William James, I will argue that the prudential reasons for precaution are overwhelming and should convince those not already persuaded by ethical arguments. While models of global systems can only reveal possible futures and not probable futures, the catastrophic threats posed by such things as global warming, ozone depletion, or population increase, though not firmly established, represent what James would call 'live options'; that is, they present us with a possibility that is at least plausible and that forces us to make momentous decisions. I conclude that we cannot afford to risk catastrophe despite the high costs this decision will involve. (shrink)