Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Artificial moral and legal personhood.John-Stewart Gordon - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-15.
    This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Moral Status and Intelligent Robots.John-Stewart Gordon & David J. Gunkel - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):88-117.
    The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 88-117, March 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on Ai, Robots, and Ethics.David J. Gunkel - 2012 - MIT Press.
    One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Much recent attention has been devoted to the "animal question" -- consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In this book, David Gunkel takes up the "machine question": whether and to what extent intelligent and autonomous machines of our own making can be considered to have legitimate moral responsibilities and any legitimate claim to moral consideration. The machine question poses a fundamental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • The Moral Standing of Machines: Towards a Relational and Non-Cartesian Moral Hermeneutics.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):61-77.
    Should we give moral standing to machines? In this paper, I explore the implications of a relational approach to moral standing for thinking about machines, in particular autonomous, intelligent robots. I show how my version of this approach, which focuses on moral relations and on the conditions of possibility of moral status ascription, provides a way to take critical distance from what I call the “standard” approach to thinking about moral status and moral standing, which is based on properties. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations