This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegelrsquo;s lsquo;new concept of beingrsquo; in the emPhenomenology of Spirit/em: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocalmdash;for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the emPhenomenology/em is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the conceptrsquo;s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms (...) that Hegelrsquo;s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the emPhenomenology/em can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of beingmdash;for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the emPhenomenology/em is pre-determined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotlersquo;s original insight : being and unity emimply/em one anothermdash;for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication. (shrink)