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  1. How Good Is Your Evidence and How Would You Know?Ulrike Hahn, Christoph Merdes & Momme von Sydow - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (4):660-678.
    This paper examines the basic question of how we can come to form accurate beliefs about the world when we do not fully know how good or bad our evidence is. Here, we show, using simulations with otherwise optimal agents, the cost of misjudging the quality of our evidence. We compare different strategies for correctly estimating that quality, such as outcome‐ and expectation‐based updating. We also identify conditions under which misjudgment of evidence quality can nevertheless lead to accurate beliefs, as (...)
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  • Testimony.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - In Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Addresses ‘too-odd-not-to-be-true’ reasoning in the assessment of testimony. This is the curious phenomenon that an initially less plausible report from multiple independent witnesses may elicit more confidence than an initially more plausible report.
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  • The kind of group you want to belong to: Effects of group structure on group accuracy.Martin L. Jönsson, Ulrike Hahn & Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Cognition 142 (C):191-204.
    There has been much interest in group judgment and the so-called 'wisdom of crowds'. In many real world contexts, members of groups not only share a dependence on external sources of information, but they also communicate with one another, thus introducing correlations among their responses that can diminish collective accuracy. This has long been known, but it has-to date-not been examined to what extent different kinds of communication networks may give rise to systematically different effects on accuracy. We argue that (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
    In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their “veritistic value”, i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because we often don't know what beliefs are actually true, and even if we did, (...)
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  • How Communication Can Make Voters Choose Less Well.Ulrike Hahn, Momme von Sydow & Christoph Merdes - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):194-206.
    In recent years, the receipt and the perception of information has changed in ways which have fueled fears about the fates of our democracies. However, real information on these possibilities or the direction of these changes does not exist. Into this gap, Hahn and colleagues bring the power of Condorcet's (1785) Jury Theorem to show that changes in our information networks have affected voter inter‐dependence so that it is likely that voters are now collectively more ignorant even if individual voter (...)
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  • Thirteen theorems in search of the truth.Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (3):261-278.
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  • (1 other version)A simulation approach to veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
    In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their , i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs (and impede the acquisition of false beliefs) in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because (1) we often don't know what beliefs are (...)
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