Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...) justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force. (shrink)

Is it possible for a person to believe that an act is morally wrong even though he himself does not disapprove of such acts—except, perhaps, in those cases where he is the victim of such acts? Does it make sense to suppose that a person could judge that one is morally obligated to act in a certain way even though he himself has no disposition whatsoever to act in such a way? Although I am inclined to think that the ordinary (...) man would answer these questions in the affirmative, almost all moral philosophers today would answer in the negative. If one examines the views of contemporary moral philosophers, one finds that virtually all of them subscribe to the thesis known as “internalism.”. (shrink)