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  1. Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities.Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
    We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...)
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  • Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
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  • E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):107-138.
    Ellsberg's (1961) famous paradox shows that decision-makers give events with ‘known’ probabilities a higher weight in their outcome evaluation. In the same article, Ellsberg suggests a preference representation which has intuitive appeal but lacks an axiomatic foundation. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) provide an axiomatisation for expected utility with non-additive probabilities. This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is (...)
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