The authors use the term “principlism” to refer to the practice of using “principles” to replace both moral theory and particular moral rules and ideals in dealing with the moral problems that arise in medical practice. The authors argue that these “principles” do not function as claimed, and that their use is misleading both practically and theoretically. The “principles” are in fact not guides to action, but rather they are merely names for a collection of sometimes superficially related matters for (...) consideration when dealing with a moral problem. The “principles” lack any systematic relationship to each other, and they often conflict with each other. These conflicts are unresolvable, since there is no unified moral theory from which they are all derived. For comparison the authors sketch the advantages of using a unified moral theory. (shrink)

Like_ _John Dewey, his mentor and friend, Sidney Hook shares the classic concep­tion of philosophy as the pursuit of wis­dom. A philosopher is concerned ulti­mately with the conception of the good life in a good society. In these essays extending over many years, Hook illustrates the activity of the philosopher in the cave of social life. He brings to bear the tools of reflective analysis on dominant social and political issues: human rights; the role of personality and leadership in history; (...) the attempt to defend freedom as we seek to preserve and extend the welfare state; and a criticism of the common premise of historical materialism shared by both Marxists and their opponents. Most significantly, Hook addresses the relation between morality and reli­gion and the place of religion in demo­cratic society. A secular and naturalistic humanism, he contends, generates an authentic, reliable commitment to the_ _democratic faith. (shrink)

abstract Normative argument is supposed to guide ways in which we might change the world, rather than to fit the world as it is. This poses certain difficulties for the notion of applied ethics. Taken literally the phrase ‘applied ethics’ suggests that principles or standards with substantial philosophical justification, in particular ethical and political principles with such justification, are applied to particular cases and guide action. However, the ‘cases’ which applied ethics discusses are themselves indeterminate, and the relation of principles (...) to these ‘cases’ differs from the relation of principles to cases in naturalistic, truth‐oriented inquiry. Writing in ‘applied ethics’, I shall argue, does not need elaborate case histories or scenarios, since the testing points for normative principles are other normative principles rather than particular cases. Normative principles and contexts to which they are applicable are indeed needed for any reasoning that is practical, but they are not sufficient. Practical ethics needs principles that can not merely be applied in certain cases or situations, but also enacted in certain ways, and requires an account of practical judgement and of the public policies that support that judgement. (shrink)