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  1. Vindicating reason.Onora O'Neill - 1992 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 280--308.
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  • The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
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  • The identity theory of truth.Thomas Baldwin - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):35-52.
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  • The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
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  • The concept of truth in formalized languages.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - In Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Oxford,: Clarendon Press. pp. 152--278.
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  • On Referring.J. F. Thomson & P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):87.
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  • The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski, C. I. Lewis & Nelson Goodman - 1956 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1):76-77.
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  • The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Bertrand Russell - 1918 - The Monist 29 (3):345-380.
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  • Zum wahrheitsproblem bei Kant.Gerold Prauss - 1969 - Kant Studien 60 (2):166-182.
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  • The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Bertrand Russell - 1940 - Open Court. Edited by David Pears.
    THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...)
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  • The folly of trying to define truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
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  • The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
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  • Zum Wahrheitsproblem bei Kant.G. Prauss - 1969 - Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 60 (2):166.
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