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  1. Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
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  • An alternate formulation of Kripke's theory of truth.Lawrence Davis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):289 - 296.
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  • Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
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  • What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
    What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of (...)
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  • (1 other version)On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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  • Reference, paradoxes and truth.Michał Walicki - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.
    We introduce a variant of pointer structures with denotational semantics and show its equivalence to systems of boolean equations: both have the same solutions. Taking paradoxes to be statements represented by systems of equations (or pointer structures) having no solutions, we thus obtain two alternative means of deciding paradoxical character of statements, one of which is the standard theory of solving boolean equations. To analyze more adequately statements involving semantic predicates, we extend propositional logic with the assertion operator and give (...)
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  • (1 other version)On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
    On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist (of course they do!) The question is whether or not they are fundamental.
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  • Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  • The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
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  • Theories of Truth. [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):706-711.
    Em português: Teorias da verdade: Uma introdução crítica.\nTradução de Alessandro Zir. São Leopoldo: Editora UNISINOS,\n2003. Aquestão da verdade no debate contemporâneo é o\ntema ótimo livro, que explica admiravelmente bem os conceitos\ncentrais da semântica, as dificuldades neles envolvidas e as\ndiversas soluções que são hoje propostas.
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  • Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
    Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics (...)
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  • Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost.Toby Meadows - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
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  • Prolegomenon to future revenge.J. C. Beall - 2007 - In The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1–30.
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