In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1, April 1995, pp. 57-74 Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? JEAN HAMPTON Many philosophers and social scientists regard the instrumental theory of practical reason as highly plausible, and standardly credit David Hume as the first philosopher to formulate this conception of reason clearly. Yet I will argue in this paper that Hume does not advocate the instrumental conception of practical (...) reason as that conception is normally understood by contemporary theorists who endorse it. Although it is often thought that Hume's position on reason is the "common-sense" one, I will argue that in a very fundamental way, his view of reason defies common-sense. The Instrumental Conception of Reason Consider the following definition of an instrumental theory of reason, understood normatively: 1) An action is rational to the extent that an agent believes (reasonably)1 that it furthers the attainment of an end; and 2) Human reasoning involves the determination of means to achieve ends, in a way described by the theory (I will say, henceforth, that using reason to determine the extent to which an action is a means to an end is an instrumental use of reason); and 3) These ends are in no way fixed by reason operating non-instrumentally; i.e., what makes them our ends is something other than reason. Jean Hampton is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ 85721 USA. 58 Jean Hampton In this article I will consider as instrumental all and only theories that accept these three theses.2 Thesis 3 is normally understood as the hallmark of the instrumental theory. Hume's famous remark "Reason is...the slave of the passions" (T 415) is a clear endorsement of this thesis. In contrast, theories of reason that do not count as instrumental maintain that reason not only pursues means to ends, but also defines ends of action, thereby denying thesis 3. On this sort of view, it is reason that is, at least sometimes, the master. For example, Kant portrays reason as concerned both with the efficiency and the morality of an action, and as that faculty which determines whether any proposed course of action is acceptable. So for Kant, reason "constructs" the ends of action insofar as it picks out from among the goals proposed by our desires those which are appropriate for us to pursue: it is the final determiner of what our ends of action ought to be. Moreover, after approving these ends, Kant says that reason provides a motivation to achieve them in virtue of the fact that it has approved them, a motivation which, if it directs a moral action, is always sufficient to determine that action, if the agent chooses to let it.3 So on Kant's view, practical reason is a master that issues directives, provides the impetus for obeying them, and calculates how best to do so. There are two reasons why philosophers have been troubled by the Kantian type of view. First, it is a conception of reason that seems unacceptable from the standpoint of science. What special "sight" or access to normative reality can we realistically ascribe to human reason, such that it can tell us our ends in life? And how does a scientific world view permit us to believe that there are unmotivated ends which we are rationally compelled to pursue? Science, after all, does not recognize such objects or properties with inherent prescriptive power. J. L. Mackie calls such objects and properties "queer"—indeed, too queer, given the strictures of science, for us to believe they obtain.4 Moreover, no scientific description of human beings has identified a rational capacity within us that can determine these objects, respond to their inherent prescriptivity, and motivate action in compliance with their requirements. The other problem facing any non-instrumental account of reason concerns motivation. Most theorists believe that whereas the question "Why be moral?" is deeply troubling, the question "Why be rational?" does not seem to be. Yet if reason is developed along Kantian lines, it becomes so expansive, and its directives so wide-ranging and divergent from interests the individual is readily able to... (shrink)