How should we understand scientific progress? Kuhn famously discussed science as its own internally driven venture, structured by paradigms. He also famously had a problem describing progress in science, as problem-solving ability failed to provide a clear rubric across paradigm change—paradigm changes tossed out problems as well as solving them. I argue here that much of Kuhn’s inability to articulate a clear view of scientific progress stems from his focus on pure science and a neglect of applied science. I trace (...) the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, showing how the distinction came about, the rhetorical uses to which the distinction has been put, and how pure science came to be both more valued by scientists and philosophers. I argue that the distinction between pure and applied science does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny, and that once we relinquish it, we can provide Kuhn with a clear sense of scientific progress. It is not one, though, that will ultimately prove acceptable. For that, societal evaluations of scientific work are needed. (shrink)

This article extends a distinction between the data of sense and the data of consciousness discussed in a former article as a context for a discussion of language usage in neuroscientific literature. Such usage attributes mental acts to biological processes. In doing so, an unintentional neglect of the data of consciousness is perpetuated as well as a denial of the empirical nature of conscious acts or states. Such usage can also contribute to an inhibition of a more adequate understanding of (...) biochemical processes. Discussions of a) objectivity, b) knowing as a conscious activity and c) the biological process of evolution will provide further contexts towards a shift in methodology providing the possibility of a more adequate understanding of the relationship between the cerebral organ and consciousness. (shrink)

In this article I analyse current efforts in cognitive neuroscience to explore the organic and cognitive processes involved in problem-solving. This analysis highlights a problem with assuming that cognitive processes can be wholly explained once one has explained organic processes. Reflection on scientific performance suggests how this problem can be evaded. This reflection on performance can also provide a paradigm for future neuroscientific research leading to a more detailed account of how brain locales and activities can be correlated with conscious (...) cognitive acts. (shrink)

This article explores the relation of serious theoretical reflection to effective teaching and practice. The article explores the curiosity of the human person as a foundation to Peace Studies. It also attempts to show that the neglect of that curiosity contributes to the growing conflict in human affairs as well as a consistent conflict in Peace research and Peace Studies. The article offers a Socratic pedagogy to teaching Peace Studies that would highlight the foundation of Peace Studies as human curiosity. (...) In this process the fragmentation of the researcher, teacher and student’s own quested natures are challenged to reform. (shrink)

This essay is an existential approach to the issue of foundations in Philosophy. The style of approach is designed to engage the philosophic reader into his or her own foundational dynamics through personal conversation and as a way of overcoming the obfuscation that has dominated the history of philosophy. Relating this to “an ethics” is an effort to manifest the critical dynamic of following one’s own acts of intelligence. The conversational approach is an effort also to overcome the isolation and (...) egoism of philosophic debate towards a more collaborative enterprise that would unify the disparate views on cognition, epistemology, and metaphysics with a view towards a more systematic control of academic work and history. (shrink)