In his provocative new book, The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. Gaus shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. He argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of (...) justice--essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years--needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, Gaus points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society--with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives--have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. Gaus defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, The Tyranny of the Ideal rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times. (shrink)

In earlier articles, the author developed what is known as the "Supersession Thesis," asserting that historic injustice may be overtaken by changes in circumstances so that a situation that was unjust when it was brought about may coincide with what justice requires at a later time. The Supersession Thesis was developed initially as a tool for considering historic injustice suffered by indigenous peoples in the European settlement of countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. In this paper, (...) the author explores the application of the Supersession Thesis to issues about the Palestinian right of return and also to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. The paper argues that, while it is not unthinkable that the Supersession Thesis might eventually legitimize the settlements and undermine the Palestinian right of return, there is no guarantee that this will happen. The application of the Supersession Thesis does not depend on the passage of time, but on changes in circumstances that a theory of justice makes relevant. Many of the circumstances that make the Supersession Thesis relevant to the post-colonial situations described do not apply in the Israeli situation. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the possibility of applying the Supersession Thesis in this case, because it enables us to assess the merits of the Thesis more sharply in relation to injustice that is taking place now, as opposed to injustice that took place in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Analyzes the historic correlation of injustice and moral judgments. Universalizability in analyzing moral judgments; Role of payment of money in the embodiment of communal remembrance; Symbolic reparation.

This article adapts John Rawls’s writings, arguing that past injustice can change what we ought to publicly affirm as the standard of justice today. My approach differs from forward-looking approaches based on alleviating prospective disadvantage and backward-looking historical entitlement approaches. In different contexts, Rawls’s own concern for the ‘social bases of self-respect’ and equal citizenship may require public endorsement of different principles or specifications of the standard of justice. Rawls’s difference principle focuses on the least advantaged socioeconomic group. I argue (...) that a historicized difference principle considers the relative standing of racial, gender, and other historically stigmatized groups; provides their members assurance by weakening incentives to manipulate justice to another group’s advantage; and may result in policies resembling reparations, though justified by forward-looking considerations of self-respect and public assurance. I then examine how disrespectful justifications were historically used to forcibly include indigenous peoples as citizens. While Rawls thinks providing citizens one package of basic liberties signals respect, indigenous self-government could better support self-respect. I invoke Rawlsian international justice, which calls for mutual respect between peoples. Indigenous peoples’ status should reflect their past and persisting peoplehood, providing assurance by weakening incentives to unjustly transform international into domestic contexts. (shrink)

The global distributive implications of automatically allocating political membership according to territoriality (jus soli) and parentage (jus sanguinis) principles have largely escaped critical scrutiny. This article begins to address this considerable gap. Securing membership status in a given state or region--with its specific level of wealth, degree of stability, and human rights record--is a crucial factor in the determination of life chances. However, birthright entitlements still dominate both our imagination and our laws in the allotment of political membership to a (...) given state. In this article we explore the striking conceptual and legal similarities between intergenerational transfers of citizenship and property. The analogy between inherited citizenship and the intergenerational transfer of property allows us to use existing qualifications found in the realm of inheritance as a model for imposing restrictions on the unlimited and perpetual transmission of membership--with the aim of ameliorating its most glaring opportunity inequalities. (shrink)

This article examines the application of social contract theorizing to questions pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples today, with particular reference to recent work by Jeremy Waldron. It is argued that such theorizing must be examined with reference not only to the content of its claims, but also with respect to its general mode of argumentation and its political function in specific contexts. Read in this light, social contract theory may function to unduly deny the claims of indigenous peoples, (...) oftentimes by shifting the register of debate to a relatively abstract and counter-factual level and relieving settler-colonial societies of the burden of proof. Insofar as social contract theory operates to this effect, it is analysed in terms of a ‘Settler Contract’. (shrink)

One of the most troubling features of international trade is that it often involves exchange between individuals facing dramatically different life circumstances, who therefore derive different levels of benefit from the exchange. Most obviously, wages are extremely low in underdeveloped countries. However, the principle underlying these wages is the same as the one the dictates wage levels in wealthy countries. It is, therefore, difficult to criticize the wages paid to ?pauper labor? without at the same time criticizing the way that (...) capitalism functions as a whole. For those who would like to question aspects of globalization, without simply repeating the standard moralizing critique of capitalism, this poses particular difficulties. This paper offers some suggestions on how egalitarians can approach this issue. The central piece of conceptual apparatus introduced, in the service of this aim, is the distinction between a ?first-best?, a ?second-best?, and an ?nth best? set of normative principles. It is then suggested, first, that capitalism is acceptable to egalitarians only within a third-best framework, and second, that this low level of idealization imposes real constraints on how far one can go in criticizing trade practices at the global level. (shrink)

Democratic deliberation is credited with a variety of virtues, including its possible usefulness in resolving, or at least ameliorating, inter‐cultural conflicts. This paper questions this claim. First, it overlooks that the facts and principles involved in these conflicts generally prove contestable and that such contestation is likely to be greater the less homogenous societies are. Second, it neglects that many, if not most, citizens have neither the time nor the inclination to acquire the conceptual and factual knowledge needed to try (...) and overcome these differences. As a result, the more inclusive and popular deliberation becomes, the less suitable it may be for overcoming cross cultural disagreements. Indeed, it has the potential to exacerbate rather than narrow the differences between majorities and minorities. These conclusions are drawn from an empirical review of a Canadian debate about aboriginal rights that followed a controversial Supreme Court of Canada decision and comparing the character of deliberation in three contexts: the legal community, the print media and legislative bodies. (shrink)