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  1. Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.
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  • Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
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  • Vi. akrasia and conflict.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1980 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):193 – 212.
    As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of (...)
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  • Motivated irrationality.David Pears - 1984 - South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press.
    This book is about self-deception and lack of self-control or wishful thinking and acting against one's own better judgement. Steering a course between the skepticism of philosophers, who find the conscious defiance of reason too paradoxical, and the tolerant empiricism of psychologists, it compares the two kinds of irrationality, and relates the conclusions drawn to the views of Freud, cognitive psychologists, and such philosophers as Aristotle, Anscombe, Hare and Davidson.
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  • Intentions, all-out evaluations and weakness of the will.Edmund Henden - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.
    The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because of an assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspond to the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a very common response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberate action does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of the support for this view has come from the difficulties the denial (...)
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  • Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...
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  • Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
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  • The Epistemology of Decision-Making “Naturalised”.Olav Gjelsvik - 2000 - In Alex Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. pp. 109--129.
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  • Paradoxes of Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 169–187.
    The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive (...)
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  • Self-deception and the nature of mind.Mark Johnston - 1994 - In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 63--91.
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  • Motivated Irrationality.D. F. Pears & David Pugmire - 1982 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1):157-196.
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  • 3. Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 63-91.
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  • Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis.Sebastian Gardner - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational, to what extent does irrationality involve self-awareness, and what is the point of irrationality? Arguing that psychoanalytic theory provides the most penetrating answers to these questions, he rejects the widespread view of the unconscious as a 'second mind', in favour of a view of it as a source of inherently irrational desires seeking expression (...)
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  • Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis.Marcia Cavell - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):405.
    This valuable and interesting book attempts to discern the essential Freudian theses about the mind and to give them a cogent philosophical defense. Like many philosophers Gardner sees psychoanalytic explanation as continuous with folk psychology, though he holds that the latter needs considerable expansion in order to accommodate irrationality of the “Freudian” sorts.
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  • Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):274-275.
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