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  1. Justification as truth-finding efficiency: How ockham's razor works.Kevin T. Kelly - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (4):485-505.
    I propose that empirical procedures, like computational procedures, are justified in terms of truth-finding efficiency. I contrast the idea with more standard philosophies of science and illustrate it by deriving Ockham's razor from the aim of minimizing dramatic changes of opinion en route to the truth.
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  • Inherent Complexity: A Problem for Statistical Model Evaluation.Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):797-809.
    This article investigates a problem for statistical model evaluation, in particular for curve fitting: by employing a different family of curves we can fit any scatter plot almost perfectly at apparently minor cost in terms of model complexity. The problem is resolved by an appeal to prior probabilities. This leads to some general lessons about how to approach model evaluation.
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  • Solomonoff Prediction and Occam’s Razor.Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):459-479.
    Algorithmic information theory gives an idealized notion of compressibility that is often presented as an objective measure of simplicity. It is suggested at times that Solomonoff prediction, or algorithmic information theory in a predictive setting, can deliver an argument to justify Occam’s razor. This article explicates the relevant argument and, by converting it into a Bayesian framework, reveals why it has no such justificatory force. The supposed simplicity concept is better perceived as a specific inductive assumption, the assumption of effectiveness. (...)
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  • Why philosophers should care about computational complexity.Scott Aaronson - 2013 - Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond:261--328.
    One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction and Goodman's (...)
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