Switch to: Citations

References in:

The will as reason

Pamela Hieronymi

Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220 (2009)

Add references

You must login to add references.

Incommensurability and agency.Joseph Raz - 1999 - In Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 110-28.details Human agents act for reasons that contribute to their good. However, in our explanation of why agents act for reasons that depend on what they value, we encounter the problem of situations in which goods are neither better than others nor are of equal value. The incommensurability of value can then be seen to lead to an incommensurability of reasons for action. Examining rationalist and classical conceptions of human agency, Raz uses the presence of incommensurability to understand how this affects (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 50 citations
(1 other version)How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.details D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x. Download Export citation Bookmark 217 citations
Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007). Download Export citation Bookmark 48 citations
Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness.Pamela Hieronymi - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.details I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 177 citations
When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive.Joseph Raz - 1999 - In Engaging Reason. International Phenomenological Society.details One's sense of self and control over our actions and intentions shape the form and direction of one's life. We are responsible for not only our actions but also for all that which is our own and under our control. Raz explores the active/passive distinction for questions of responsibility and how our life becomes our own when it is under our control and guided by reason. We are ourselves when we are responsive to reasons—when we act for intentional reasons with (...) respect to objects of value. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Disengaging reason.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 117--28.details Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations

1