Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Two Concepts of Cause.Elliott Sober - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:405 - 424.
    A distinction is drawn between property causation and token causation. According to the former, a positive causal factor in a population raises the probability of its effects within "background contexts". The latter, which concerns "actual physical connections" between token events, is not explicated here although its distinctness from the first concept and its importance are discussed. The applicability of both is illustrated by two currently controversial issues in evolutionary theory -- the units of selection controversy and the use of parsimony (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • A tale of two effects.Christopher Hitchcock - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):361-396.
    In recent years, there has been a philosophical cottage industry producing arguments that our concept of causation is not univocal: that there are in fact two concepts of causation, corresponding to distinct species of causal relation. Papers written in this tradition have borne titles like “Two Concepts of Cause” and “Two Concepts of Causation”. With due apologies to Charles Dickens, I hereby make my own contribution to this genre.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Causal knowledge: That great guide of human life.Chirstopher Read Hitchcock - forthcoming - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Introduction.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Probabilistic causality: Reply to John dupré.Ellery Eells - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):105-114.
    John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961-62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement just alluded to should be given up. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Probabilistic Causality: A Rejoinder to Ellery Eells.John Dupré - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):690 - 698.
    In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the "contextual unanimity thesis"). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Laws of Nature.John Carroll - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):603-609.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations