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Freedom without Choice: Medieval Theories of the Essence of Freedom

In Thomas Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 194-216 (2018)

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  1. Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism.Tobias Hoffmann & Cyrille Michon - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...)
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  • Anselm.Sandra Visser & Thomas Williams - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas Williams.
    The reason of faith -- Thought and language -- Truth -- The Monologion arguments for the existence of God -- The Proslogion argument for the existence of God -- The divine attributes -- Thinking and speaking about God -- Creation and the word -- The Trinity -- Modality -- Freedom -- Morality -- Incarnation and atonement -- Original sin, grace, and salvation.
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  • Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom.Bonnie Kent - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1073-1092.
    From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is (...)
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  • Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy.Tobias Hoffmann - 2020 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book Tobias Hoffmann studies the medieval free will debate during its liveliest period, from the 1220s to the 1320s, and clarifies its background in Aristotle, Augustine, and earlier medieval thinkers. Among the wide range of authors he examines are not only well-known thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, but also a number of authors who were just as important in their time and deserve to be rediscovered today. To shed further light on their (...)
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  • 11 Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality.Marilyn McCord Adams - 1999 - In Paul Vincent Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • What is Freedom?Jamie Anne Spiering - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):27-46.
    Josef Pieper wrote about “the silence of St. Thomas”—faced with some of philosophy’s toughest questions, Thomas does not give “a textbook reply.” In this paper, I note an instance of such silence: Thomas gives no dogmatic, unequivocal answer to the question “What is freedom?” and this omission seems to have been deliberate. While his predecessors and contemporaries discussed the definition of freedom formally, Thomas does not do so, nor does he offer a precise account of libertas. Why would Thomas avoid (...)
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  • Anselm’s Account of Freedom.Thomas Williams & Sandra Visser - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):221-244.
    In this paper we offer a reconstruction of Anselm’s account of freedom that resolves various apparent inconsistencies. The linchpin of this account is the definition of freedom. Anselm argues that the power to preserve rectitude for its own sake requires the power to initiate an action of which the agent is the ultimate cause, but it does not always require that alternative possibilities be available to the agent. So while freedom is incompatible with coercion and external causal determination, an agent (...)
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