The concept of human dignity is increasingly invoked in bioethical debate and, indeed, in international instruments concerned with biotechnology and biomedicine. While some commentators consider appeals to human dignity to be little more than rhetoric and not worthy of serious consideration, the authors of this groundbreaking new study give such appeals distinct and defensible meaning through an application of the moral theory of Alan Gewirth.

What does it mean for someone to have a moral right to something? What kinds of creatures can have rights, and which rights can they have? While rights are indispensable to our moral and political thinking, they are also mysterious and controversial; as long as these controversies remain unsolved, rights will remain vulnerable to skepticism. Here, Sumner constructs both a coherent concept of a moral right and a workable substantive theory of rights to provide the moral foundation necessary to dispel (...) such doubts. (shrink)

Alan Gewirth's _Reason and Morality_, in which he set forth the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a major work of modern ethical theory that, though much debated and highly respected, has yet to gain full acceptance. Deryck Beyleveld contends that this resistance stems from misunderstanding of the method and logical operations of Gewirth's central argument. In this book Beyleveld seeks to remedy this deficiency. His rigorous reconstruction of Gewirth's argument gives its various parts their most compelling formulation and clarifies its (...) essential logical structure. Beyleveld then classifies all the criticisms that Gewirth's argument has received and measures them against his reconstruction of the argument. The overall result is an immensely rich picture of the argument, in which all of its complex issues and key moves are clearly displayed and its validity can finally be discerned. The comprehensiveness of Beyleveld's treatment provides ready access to the entire debate surrounding the foundational argument of _Reason and Morality_. It will be required reading for all who are interested in Gewirth's theory and deontological ethics and will be of central importance to moral and legal theorists. (shrink)

In a community that takes rights seriously, consent features pervasively in both moral and legal discourse as a justifying reason: stated simply, where there is consent, there can be no complaint. However, without a clear appreciation of the nature of a consent-based justification, its integrity, both in principle and in practice, is liable to be compromised. This book examines the role of consent as a procedural justification, discussing the prerequisites for an adequate consent -- in particular, that an agent with (...) the relevant capacity has made an unforced and informed choice, that the consent has been clearly signalled, and that the scope of the authorisation covers the act in question. It goes on to highlight both the Fallacy of Necessity (where there is no consent, there must be a wrong) and the Fallacy of Sufficiency (where there is consent, there cannot be a wrong). Finally, the extent to which the authority of law itself rests on consent is considered. If the familiarity of consent-based justification engenders confusion and contempt, the analysis in this book acts as a corrective, identifying a range of abusive or misguided practices that variously under-value or over-value consent, that fictionalise it or that are fixated by it, and that treat it too casually or too cautiously. In short, the analysis in Consent in the Law points the way towards recognising an important procedural justification for precisely what it is as well as giving it a more coherent application. (shrink)

The philosophical debate about the concept of Law is dominated by two traditions: Legal Positivism and Natural-Law Theory. Within Anglo-American Jurisprudence, Legal Positivism is unquestionably the more popular approach. Whilst in recent years there have been a number of assaults upon this ruling view, opposition to Legal Positivism is still very much at the margins of contempory Jurisprudence, The authors of this major work argue, however, that Legal Positivism should be rejected, contending that it is incorrect not in some minor (...) detail but in what they take to be its central tenet, the thesis that the concept of law is morally neutral. Their contention amounts to a rejection of Legal Positivism in favour of Natural-Law Theory. Law as a Moral Judgment is an important and controversial contribution to Jurisprudence. It puts forward a coherent and well argued case which will have to be answered by those of opposed opinion. (shrink)

This book is a critical, forward-looking and interdisciplinary text. Its chief aim is to advance understanding of medical law by reference both moral theory and the regulatory context. The first chapter seeks to map competing approaches within moral objectivism and outline the pressures created by the impact of market forces and medical tourism, political interests, medical and professional interests, changing perceptions of medicine, developing technologies, limited resources and the impact of increasingly direct (international and domestic) recognition of human rights. Chapters (...) 2 to 16 apply the analytical tools presented in chapter 1 to the topics of medical law and seek to demonstrate the need for a moral epistemology of the type defended in chapter 17. (shrink)