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  1. Sets, species, and evolution: Comments on Philip Kitcher's "species".Elliott Sober - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):334-341.
    One possible interpretation of the species concept is that specifies are natural kinds. Another species concept is that species are individuals whose parts are organisms. Philip Kitcher takes seriously both these ideas; he sees a role for the genealogical/historical conception and also for the one that is “purely qualitative”. I criticize his ideas here. I see the genealogical conception at work in biological discussion of species and it is presupposed by an active and inventive research program, but the natural kind (...)
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  • (1 other version)Species.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.
    I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected (...)
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  • The nature of biological species.Kent E. Holsinger - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):293-307.
    Although it is possible to regard a species as a set with a special internal structure, it is preferable to regard a species as an individual precisely to emphasize this internal structure. It is necessary to recognize, moreover, that two organisms that are part of a single entity with respect to one process need not be part of a single entity with respect to another process. Furthermore, choosing to regard two entities (with respect to one process) as conspecific is not (...)
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  • Against the monism of the moment: A reply to Elliott Sober.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):616-630.
    In his "Discussion" (1984), Elliott Sober offers some criticisms of the view about species--pluralistic realism--advocated in my 1984. Sober's comments divide into three parts. He attempts to show that species are not sets; he responds to my critique of David Hull's thesis that species are individuals; and he offers some arguments for the claim that species are "chunks of the genealogical nexus." I consider each of these objections in turn, arguing that each of them fails. I attempt to use Sober's (...)
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