This paper addresses five questions: First, what is trajectory of Western liberal ethics and politics in defining life, rights and citizenship? Second, how will neuro-remediation and other technologies change the definition of death for the brain injured and the cryonically suspended? Third, will people always have to be dead to be cryonically suspended? Fourth, how will changing technologies and definitions of identity affect the status of people revived from brain injury and cryonic suspension? I propose that Western liberal thought is (...) working towards a natural end, a “telos.” In response to a variety of biotechnologies, law and public opinion in liberal democracies will be forced to make explicit that the rights of a living thing are determined by its level of consciousness. I discuss the way that technology will force three clarifications about the value of consciousness, at the beginning, the end and boundaries of human life. Sentience and personhood will become the basis of moral concern, regardless of its media. Just as human rights have become independent of race, gender and property, rights will become independent of being a breathing human being. But even as we make this transition, the cryonically preserved are still likely to be considered dead for pragmatic reasons, albeit with gradually increasing rights as technology makes their reanimation increasingly probable. I suggest that it could be acceptable to cryonicists that the frozen continue to be defined as dead if assisted suicide can be legalized. Under a liberal assisted suicide policy cryonicists might be allowed to carry out suspension before a declaration of death, preserving the maximum amount of neural information. The gradual redefinition of life and personal identity in terms of psychological continuity will also have consequences for the legal status of the reanimated. If, due to information loss, the reanimated do not meet a threshold of psychological continuity, they may be considered new persons. Cryonicists may therefore wish to specify ahead of time whether they are still interested in being reanimated if pre-animation assessment suggests that the result will not meet the necessary threshold of continuity. Finally, I touch on the way that neural technology will fundamentally problematize the separate, autonomous self on which liberal democratic values are based, leading to a legal and political Singularity. It is this looming neural Singularity that makes the proposed liberal democratic telos a final stage in humanistic thought, before it is superceded by something radically different. (shrink)

Enlightenment values are built around the presumption of an independent rational self, citizen, consumer and pursuer of self-interest. Even the authoritarian and communitarian variants of the Enlightenment presumed the existence of autonomous individuals, simply arguing for greater weight to be given to their collective interests. Since Hume, however, radical Enlightenment empiricists have called into question the existence of a discrete, persistent self. Today neuroscientific reductionism has contributed to the rejection of an essentialist model of personal identity. Contemporary transhumanism has yet (...) to grapple with the radical consequences of the erosion of liberal individualism on their projects of individually chosen enhancement and longevity. Most transhumanists still reflect an essentialist idea of personal identity, even as they embrace projects of radical cognitive enhancement that would change every constituent element of consciousness. Transhumanists need to grapple with how their projects and ethics would change if personal identity is an arbitrary, malleable fiction. (shrink)

Transhumanism has a great deal in common with religion as traditionally conceived. James J. Hughes claims that "a variety of metaphysics appear to be compatible with one form of transhumanism or the other, from various Abrahamic views of the soul to Buddho-Hindu ideas of reincarnation to animist ideas."1 Most notably, the range of technologically optimistic views held by transhumanists shares with many religions a longing for transcendence of our presently frail and limited situation. In contrast to the doctrines of many (...) traditional religions, however, transhumanist salvation will come not with the aid of divine intervention, but solely from our own ingenuity (or at least from the ingenuity of beings that result... (shrink)

There are positive views towards use of science and technology in all Asian countries, and positive views towards use of enhancement in China, India and Thailand. After considering of the widespread use of cosmetic surgery and other body enhancements in Asian countries, and the generally positive views towards letting individuals make choices about improvement of themselves, the paper concludes that we can expect other enhancements to also be adopted rapidly in Asia. There will be future ethical dilemmas emerging from this (...) with concepts of preservation of nature, flow with nature, and definitions of human-ness, along with concepts of harmony and social justice. Japan is less willing to engage in genetic enhancement compared to China, India and Thailand, despite widespread cosmetic surgery across Asia. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper integrates some Buddhist moral values, attitudes and self‐cultivation techniques into a discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement technologies – in particular, pharmaceutical enhancements. Many Buddhists utilize meditation techniques that are both integral to their practice and are believed to enhance the cognitive and affective states of experienced practitioners. Additionally, Mahāyāna Buddhism's teaching on skillful means permits a liberal use of methods or techniques in Buddhist practice that yield insight into our selfnature or aid in alleviating or eliminating (...) dukha . These features of many, if not most, Buddhist traditions will inform much of the Buddhist assessment of pharmaceutical enhancements offered in this paper. Some Buddhist concerns about the effects and context of the use of pharmaceutical enhancements will be canvassed in the discussion. Also, the author will consider Buddhist views of the possible harms that may befall human and nonhuman research subjects, interference with a recipient's karma, the artificiality of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the possible motivations or intentions of healthy individuals pursuing pharmacological enhancement. Perhaps surprisingly, none of these concerns will adequately ground a reflective Buddhist opposition to the further development and continued use of pharmaceutical enhancements, either in principle or in practice. The author argues that Buddhists, from at least certain traditions – particularly Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions – should advocate the development or use of pharmaceutical enhancements if a consequence of their use is further insight into our self‐nature or the reduction or alleviation of dukha. (shrink)