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  1. Views of the person with dementia.Julian C. Hughes - 2001 - Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (2):86-91.
    In this paper I consider, in connection with dementia, two views of the person. One view of the person is derived from Locke and Parfit. This tends to regard the person solely in terms of psychological states and his/her connections. The second view of the person is derived from a variety of thinkers. I have called it the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. This view, I suggest, more readily squares with the reality of clinical experience. It regards the person as (...)
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  • Ten Principles of Values-Based Medicine (VBM).K. W. M. Fulford - 2003 - In Thomas Schramme & Johannes Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter. pp. 50-80.
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  • Nudging and Informed Consent.Shlomo Cohen - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):3-11.
    Libertarian paternalism's notion of “nudging” refers to steering individual decision making so as to make choosers better off without breaching their free choice. If successful, this may offer an ideal synthesis between the duty to respect patient autonomy and that of beneficence, which at times favors paternalistic influence. A growing body of literature attempts to assess the merits of nudging in health care. However, this literature deals almost exclusively with health policy, while the question of the potential benefit of nudging (...)
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  • Salvaging the concept of nudge: Table 1.Yashar Saghai - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):487-493.
    In recent years, ‘nudge’ theory has gained increasing attention for the design of population-wide health interventions. The concept of nudge puts a label on efficacious influences that preserve freedom of choice without engaging the influencees’ deliberative capacities. Given disagreements over what it takes genuinely to preserve freedom of choice, the question is whether health influences relying on automatic cognitive processes may preserve freedom of choice in a sufficiently robust sense to be serviceable for the moral evaluation of actions and policies. (...)
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  • Value judgements and conceptual tensions: decision-making in relation to hospital discharge for people with dementia.Helen Greener, Marie Poole, Charlotte Emmett, John Bond, Stephen J. Louw & Julian C. Hughes - 2012 - Clinical Ethics 7 (4):166-174.
    We reflect, using a vignette, on conceptual tensions and the value judgements that lie behind difficult decisions about whether or not the older person with dementia should return home or move into long-term care following hospital admission. The paper seeks, first, to expose some of the difficulties arising from the assessment of residence capacity, particularly around the nature of evaluative judgements and conceptual tensions inherent in the legal approach to capacity. Secondly, we consider the assessment of best interests around place (...)
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  • Thinking Through Dementia.Julian C. Hughes - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Dementia affects millions of people throughout the world. Thinking through Dementia offers a critique of the main models used to understand dementia-the biomedical, neuropsychological, and social constructionist. It discusses clinical issues and cases, together with philosophical work that might help us to better understand and treat this illness.
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  • Rational non-interventional paternalism: why doctors ought to make judgments of what is best for their patients.J. Savulescu - 1995 - Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (6):327-331.
    This paper argues that doctors ought to make all things considered value judgments about what is best for their patients. It illustrates some of the shortcomings of the model of doctor as 'fact-provider'. The 'fact-provider' model fails to take account of the fact that practising medicine necessarily involves making value judgments; that medical practice is a moral practice and requires that doctors reflect on what ought to be done, and that patients can make choices which fail to express their autonomy (...)
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