Reidel, 1976. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (3.3 MB).

1. 1. PROGRAM It will be our aim to reconstruct, with precision, certain views which have been traditionally associated with nominalism and to investigate problems arising from these views in the construction of interpreted formal systems. Several such systems are developed in accordance with the demand that the sentences of a system which is acceptable to a nominalist must not imply the existence of any entities other than individuals. Emphasis will be placed on the constructionist method of philosophical analysis. To (...) follow this method is to introduce the central notions of the subject-matter to be investigated into a system governed by exact rules. For example, the constructionist method of investigating the properties of geometric figures may consist in formulating a system of postulates and definitions which, together with the apparatus of formal logic, generates all necessary truths concerning geometric figures. Similarly, a constructionist analysis of the notion of an individual may take the form of an axiomatic theory whose provable assertions are just those which seem essential to the role played by the concept of an individual in system atic contexts. Such axiomatic theories gain in interest if they are supple mented by precise semantical rules specifying the denotation of all terms and the truth conditions of all sentences of the theory. (shrink)

This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.

I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...) This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of "propositional attitudes.". (shrink)

1. This paper is an informal exposition of a model-theoretic semantics for knowledge and belief set out in full detail else where. Considerations of space and simplicity prevent any recapitulation of tracts of formal definitions. My aim is simply to inform the reader of the alleged existence of one “new direction” in semantics, and to direct him to the original source for its detailed development. I shall explain certain self-imposed limitations on the scope and adequacy conditions of this treatment. Then, (...) in subsequent discussion of the semantical problems which I claim to have treated, I shall try to impart the flavour of the technical methods involved. (shrink)

Neither question (1) nor question (2) posed on page 446 have been adequately answered in this paper. Regarding (1) we have merely given functor maps onto the object languages of physical theories and regarding (2) we have merely described the algebraic structure of observables. A more satisfactory treatment will most likely involve (1) a generalization to algebraic categories, universal algebra and model theory in such a way as to capture the full inference structure of (perhaps van Fraassen's modal) quantum logic, (...) and (2) the introduction of the category of differentiable manifolds in order to capture the full symplectic structure of (perhaps Chernoff-Marsden's) Hamiltonian dynamics. (See van Fraassen [4] and Chernoff-Marsden [5] in Other References.)Finally, the intriguing suggestion of Finkelstein that “category theory is to metaphysics what group theory is to physics” deserves serious consideration. Indeed, although the theme has not been touched on explicitly in this paper it was central in motivating the project initially. However, it is more properly to be developed in a context external to a symposium on quantum logic. (shrink)