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How properties emerge

Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17 (1997)

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  1. Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
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  • Concepts of supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
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  • Supervenience for multiple domains.Jaegwon Kim - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):129-50.
    The main topic of this paper is the question of how supervenience can be understood as a relation between two families of properties each applicable to a distinct domain of individuals.
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  • Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics1.Paul Teller - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1):71-81.
    One can give a strong sense to the idea that a relation does not 'reduce' to non-relational properties by saying that a relation does not supervene upon the non-relational properties of its relata. That there are such inherent relations I call the doctrine of relational holism, a doctrine which seems to conflict with traditional ideas about physicalism. At least parts of classical physics seem to be free of relational holism, but quantum mechanics, on at least some interpretations, incorporates the doctrine (...)
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  • Holism and Nonseparability.Richard A. Healey - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (8):393.
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  • (1 other version)Emergence, Not Supervenience.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (S4):S337-S345.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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  • Aspects of emergence.Paul Humphreys - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):53-71.
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  • Individuality, supervenience and bell's theorem.Steven French - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):1-22.
    Some recent work in the philosophy of quantum mechanics has suggested that quantum systems can be thought of as non-separable and therefore non-individual, in some sense, in Bell and E.P.R. type situations. This suggestion is set in the context of previous work regarding the individuality of quantal particles and it is argued that such entities can be considered as individuals if their non-classical statistical correlations are understood in terms of non-supervenient relations holding between them. We conclude that such relations are (...)
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  • (1 other version)Emergence, not supervenience.Paul W. Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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  • The Chances of Explanation.Paul Humphreys - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):353-374.
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