If you believe that there are restrictions on what we as moral agents can do to others, but that these restrictions can give way in the face of competing considerations, then you believe in thresholds for rights. In this dissertation I develop an account of thresholds for rights, in defence of a position which is often stated but rarely explained or defended. I begin with the obvious question: How much needs to be at stake before a right's claim is overridden? (...) ;Less obvious, but equally crucial, are questions about the distribution of the total which needs to be at stake. After developing a framework for answering that question, in subsequent chapters I deal with other factors which may influence our judgements about the overridability of rights' claims, including the numbers and identities of the agents involved. (shrink)

Discussions of the morality of the Gulf War have tended to embrace the traditional theory of the just war uncritically and to apply its tenets in a mechanical and unimaginative fashion. We believe, by contrast, that careful reflection of the Gulf War reveals that certain principles of the traditional theory are oversimplifications that require considerable refinement. Our aims, therefore, are both practical and theoretical. We hope to contribute to a better understanding of the ethics both of war in general and (...) of the Gulf War in particular. (shrink)

But what if in order to save 0nc’s life one has to ki]1 another person? In some cases that is obviously permissible. In a case I will call Villainous Aggrcssor, you are standing in :1 meadow, innocently minding your own business, and 21 truck suddenly heads toward you. You try to sidestep the truck, but it tums as you tum. Now you can sec the driver: he is a mam you know has long hated you. What to do? You cannot (...) outrun thc truck. Fortunately, this is not pure nightmare: you just happen to have em antitank gun with you, and can blow up the truck. Of course, if you do this you will kill thc driver, but that does not matter; it is morally permissible for you to blow up thc truck, driver and 211, in defense of your life. (shrink)

Just war theory is a moral tradition that sets out the criteria that must be met for a war to be morally justified. In this dissertation, I undertake a critical analysis of those criteria. That analysis often makes use of an analogy with individual self-defense theory. Therefore, as part of the introductory chapter, I point to the parallels between international military conflict and domestic self-defense, and I also describe the strengths and limitations of the analogy between the two theories. ;I (...) then turn to the ad bellum criteria, arguing that the right intention criterion should not be included in the criteria, and that the reasonable hope of success criterion is redundant. As for the competent authority criterion, I argue that its inclusion is appropriate, but that the criterion cannot be used by an unjust enemy to demonstrate that he is being treated unjustly. With respect to the central criteria of just cause, last resort, and proportionality, I provide my own accounts of them. ;In considering the in bello criteria, I begin by arguing that there is a closer relationship between in bello and ad bellum criteria than is often contended. I then provide my own account of the in bello criteria. In particular, I develop an account of the discrimination criterion that does not rely on considerations of intention. ;In the final chapter of the dissertation, I discuss some comparative weighing principles that are relevant in applying the ad bellum proportionality and last resort criteria and the in bello proportionality and necessity criteria. (shrink)