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  1. (1 other version)At the margins of moral personhood.Eva Kittay - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):100-131.
    In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view that only intrinsic (...)
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  • Response to “Abortion and Assent” by Rosamond Rhodes.Matti Häyry - 2001 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (1):79-87.
    Abortions are legally permitted in most Western societies if there is a reasonable expectation that the child, if born, would be physically or mentally disabled. Even late-term abortions, which would not be allowed in the case of healthy fetuses, are accepted on the basis of foreseen disability.
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  • Practical Ethics.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):264.
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  • (1 other version)The Moral Significance of Birth.Mary Ann Warren - 1988 - Monash Bioethics Review 7 (2):32-44.
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  • Review of Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. [REVIEW]Carolyn McLeod - 2000 - Hastings Center Report 30 (5):44.
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  • What Exactly Did You Claim?Matti Häyry - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):107-112.
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  • Academic Freedom, Public Reactions, and Anonymity.Matti Häyry - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (4):170-173.
    Academic freedom can be defined as immunity against adverse reactions from the general public, designed to keep scholars unintimidated and productive even after they have published controversial ideas. Francesca Minerva claims that this notion of strict instrumental academic freedom is supported by Ronald Dworkin, and that anonymity would effectively defend the sphere of immunity implied by it. Against this, I argue that the idea defended by Minerva finds no support in the work by Dworkin referred to; that anonymity would not (...)
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