Introduction. Il est bien connu que la correspondance de Curry-Howard permet d'associer un programme, sous la forme d'un λ-terme, à toute preuve intuitionniste, formalisée dans le calcul des prédicats du second ordre. Cette correspondance a été étendue, assez récemment, à la logique classique moyennant une extension convenable du λ-calcul. Chaque théorème formalisé en logique du second ordre correspond donc à une spécification de programme.Il se pose alors le problème, en général tout à fait non trivial, de trouver la spécification associée (...) à un théorème donné; autrement dit, de déterminer le comportement opérationnel commun aux λ-termes associés aux diverses démonstrations formelles du théorème considéré.Cette question est résolue ici pour le théorème de complétude de la logique classique.La première étape consiste à formaliser convenablement ce théorème en logique du second ordre. Ce travail est fait complètement dans la section 1. Il a comme sous-produit, peut-être inattendu, de montrer que ce théorème est prouvable en logique intuitionniste du second ordre. Ceci, toutefois, à condition d'introduire une légère variante de la notion de modèle, en admettant un modèle supplémentaire trivial, où toute formule est satisfaite.On notera, à ce sujet, que des preuves intuitionnistes du théorème de complétude de la logique intuitionniste, utilisant des variantes de la notion de modele de Kripke, ont été données par H. Friedman [7] et W. Veldman [8]. On remarquera également qu'un argument de G. Kreisel [2] montre que le théorème de complétude habituel de la logique intuitionniste n'a pas de preuve intuitionniste. (shrink)

Tarski asked whether the arithmetic identities taught in high school are complete for showing all arithmetic equations valid for the natural numbers. The answer to this question for the language of arithmetic expressions using a constant for the number one and the operations of product and exponentiation is affirmative, and the complete equational theory also characterises isomorphism in the typed lambda calculus, where the constant for one and the operations of product and exponentiation respectively correspond to the unit type and (...) the product and arrow type constructors. This paper studies isomorphisms in typed lambda calculi with empty and sum types from this viewpoint. Our main contribution is to show that a family of so-called Wilkie–Gurevič identities, that plays a pivotal role in the study of Tarski’s high school algebra problem, arises from type-theoretic isomorphisms. We thus close an open problem by establishing that the theory of type isomorphisms in the presence of product, arrow, and sum types is not finitely axiomatisable. Further, we observe that for type theories with arrow, empty and sum types the correspondence between isomorphism and arithmetic equality generally breaks down, but that it still holds in some particular cases including that of type isomorphism with the empty type and equality with zero. (shrink)

We show that, if a suitable intuitionistic metatheory proves that consistency implies satisfiability for subfinite sets of propositional formulas relative either to standard structures or to Kripke models, then that metatheory also proves every negative instance of every classical propositional tautology. Since reasonable intuitionistic set theories such as HAS or IZF do not demonstrate all such negative instances, these theories cannot prove completeness for intuitionistic propositional logic in the present sense.

In 1957, Gödel proved that completeness for intuitionistic predicate logic HPL implies forms of Markov's Principle, MP. The result first appeared, with Kreisel's refinements and elaborations, in Kreisel. Featuring large in the Gödel-Kreisel proofs are applications of the axiom of dependent choice, DC. Also in play is a form of Herbrand's Theorem, one allowing a reduction of HPL derivations for negated prenex formulae to derivations of negations of conjunctions of suitable instances. First, we here show how to deduce Gödel's results (...) by alternative means, ones arguably more elementary than those of Kreisel. We avoid DC and Herbrand's Theorem by marshalling simple facts about negative translations and Markov's Rule. Second, the theorems of Gödel and Kreisel are commonly interpreted as demonstrating the unprovability of completeness for HPL, if means of proof are confined within strictly intuitionistic metamathematics. In the closing section, we assay some doubts about such interpretations. (shrink)

It is demonstrated how Kripke models for intuitionistic predicate logic can be applied in order to prove classical theorems. As examples proofs of the independence of the axiom of constructibility, of the omitting types theorem and of Shelah's ultrapower theorem are sketched.

In 1996, Krivine applied Friedman's A-translation in order to get an intuitionistic version of Gödel completeness result for first-order classical logic and countable languages and models. Such a result is known to be intuitionistically underivable 559), but Krivine was able to derive intuitionistically a weak form of it, namely, he proved that every consistent classical theory has a model. In this paper, we want to analyze the ideas Krivine's remarkable result relies on, ideas which where somehow hidden by the heavy (...) formal machinery used in the original proof. We show that the ideas in Krivine's proof can be used to intuitionistically derive some crucial mathematical results, which were supposed to be purely classical up to now: the Ultrafilter Theorem for countable Boolean algebras, and the maximal ideal theorem for countable rings. (shrink)

Algebraic proofs of the cut-elimination theorems for classical and intuitionistic logic are presented, and are used to show how one can sometimes extract a constructive proof and an algorithm from a proof that is nonconstructive. A variation of the double-negation translation is also discussed: if ϕ is provable classically, then ¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal logic, where θnf denotes the negation-normal form of θ. The translation is used to show that cut-elimination theorems for classical logic can be viewed as special (...) cases of the cut-elimination theorems for intuitionistic logic. (shrink)