Philosophical semantics requires an ontology that includes negative as well as positive states of affairs as truth-makers and truth-breakers. Theories that try to do without negative states of affairs while interpreting propositional truth as positive correspondence with existent states of affairs are inherently inadequate and incomplete. A semantics and ontology of negative states of affairs can also do justice to positive states of affairs, since the iterated negative state of affairs that a negative state of affairs exists describes a positive (...) state of affairs, but the iterated positive state of affairs that a positive state of affairs exists never describes a negative state of affairs. Negative states of affairs are not only essential to semantics, but to a complete description of the world; they include phenomena of presence in absence and the metaphysics of gaps, lacks, holes and interstitia. The conceivability of an empty or null universe as consisting of nothing but negative states of affairs recalls a famous problem of Parmenides. (shrink)

My interest in Warranted Christian Belief is in this question: Is it rational, or reasonable, or justified, or warranted to accept Christian belief? But there is a prior question: Is the very idea of Christian belief coherent? Many theologians and others believe that there is real difficulty with the idea that our concepts could apply to such a being as the Christian God, and that this constitutes a serious problem for Christian belief: Christian belief involves the belief that it is (...) possible to think of, refer to, and predicate properties of God, but in fact none of these things are possible, because human concepts cannot apply to God. In this chapter and the next, I examine this objection to Christian belief, turning in this chapter to the thought of Immanuel Kant. Against the opinions of some, I argue that there is no good reason provided by Kant for the conclusion that our concepts do not apply to God. (shrink)