Hence, there is still controversy over which of the two versions of the deduction deserves priority and whether indeed any distinction between them can be maintained that would go beyond questions of presentation and involve the structure of the proof itself. Schopenhauer and Heidegger held that the first edition alone fully expresses Kant's unique philosophy, while Kant himself, as well as many other Kantians, have only seen a difference in the method of presentation.

The purpose of this paper is first to explain a general notion of transcendental deductions, of which the Kantian are special cases; next to show, and to illustrate by examples from Kant’s work, that no transcendental deduction can be successful; and thirdly to put one of Kant’s achievements in its proper light by substituting for his spurious distinction between metaphysical exposition and transcendental deduction, a revised notion of metaphysical exposition and of the philosophical tasks arising out of it.

Kant’s remark that the first Kritik should be read as a treatise on method rather than a system of doctrine lends support to recent forays against his theory of proof, for the comment promotes the mistaken supposition that his method can be studied independently of his commitments in ontology and other areas. Irony infects the criticisms in question because they set transcendental logic against a standard that Kant repudiates. The point will be illustrated by showing how Kant anticipates and blunts (...) a strong attack against his position on method. (shrink)