This article examines the philosophical implications underlying Bacon's views on historical knowledge, paying special attention to that variety of historical knowledge described by Bacon as “natural.” More specifically, this article explores the interplay of history and fable. In the sphere of thought, fabula is the equivalent to materia in nature. Both are described by Bacon as being “versatile” and “pliant.” In Bacon's system of knowledge, philosophy, as the domain of reason, starts from historiae and fabulae, once memory and the imagination (...) have fulfilled their cognitive tasks. This means that, for Bacon, there is no such thing as a pure use of reason. He advocates a kind of reason that, precisely because it is involved with matter's inner motions, is constitutively 'impure'. The article shows how the terms historia and fabula cover key semantic areas in defining Bacon's philosophy: historia may mean “history” as well as “story,” fabula “myth” as well “story.” In both cases, we can see significant oscillations from a stronger meaning to a weaker one, as if the power of nature decreases moving from histories and myths to stories. On the other hand, there are cases in which Bacon seems to stick to a diachronic view of the meaning of fables and histories, such that the transition from myths to history, especially natural history, is described as a collective effort towards reality and enlightenment. (shrink)

This paper investigates some examples of Baconian experimentation, coming from Bacon’s ‘scientific’ works, i.e. his Latin natural histories and the posthumous Sylva Sylvarum. I show that these experiments fulfill a variety of epistemic functions. They have a classificatory function, being explicitly used to delimitate and define new fields of investigation. They also play an important role in concept formation. Some of the examples discussed in this paper show how Francis Bacon developed instruments and technologies for the production of new phenomena, (...) using them subsequently to define new concepts. In some other cases, experiments can also play and important role in modeling natural phenomena. In examining the role and functions of Baconian experimentation, this paper uses common topics in philosophy of the scientific experiment. With this, it attempts to bridge the gap between the more historical Baconian studies and the contemporary philosophy of science. My examples are chosen with two purposes. On the one hand I intend to show that Bacon was fully aware of the diversity of epistemic functions experiments can play in the process of discovery. On the other hand, these examples are also chosen with the purpose of illustrating a somewhat more general claim, namely that a thorough investigation of Bacon’s natural and experimental histories can unveil a more complex picture of the relations between theory and experiment than it has been usually assumed. (shrink)

Francis Bacon's reflections on atomism have generally been misunderstood because they have never been systematically studied in relation to the speculative chemical philosophy which he developed in the interval between about 1592 and his death in 1626. This philosophy, in many respects unknown to historians until quite recently, was the only body of positive science which Bacon ever accepted. The speculative philosophy was, on the whole, chemical and non-mechanical, and consequently not consistent with atomist doctrines. In fact, Bacon never at (...) any time accepted the principal atomist tenets. It is therefore necessary to explain why he was interested in atomism at all. Of the several reasons for his interest one is especially important—namely, his belief that the speculative and atomic philosophies had affinities. In particular, he believed that of all the ancient philosophies atomism alone approached the ideals associated with the key notion of ‘subtlety’—ideals represented in their highest form in the speculative philosophy. (shrink)

The recent surge of interest in Bacon's own attempts at natural history has revealed a complex interplay with his speculative ideas in natural philosophy. This research has given rise to the concern that his natural histories are theory-laden in a way that Bacon ought to find unacceptable, given his prescription in the Parasceve for a reliable body of factual instances that can be used as a storehouse for induction. This paper aims to resolve this tension by elaborating a moderate foundationalist (...) account of Bacon's method and by appealing to a distinction he makes, in a letter to Father Fulgentio, between pure and impure natural histories. I argue that the discussions of causes and axioms in the published histories render them impure, since that material properly belongs to Part Four of the Instauratio, but that this interplay with Part Four is necessary for the sake of the continued refinement of Part Three (the natural historical part). Bacon ultimately aims for a storehouse of instances, to be attained at the culmination of this process of refinement, and at that point the history should be published in its pure form. (shrink)