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Rationalizable Signaling

Erkenntnis 79 (4):1-34 (2014)

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  1. Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  • Presumptive meanings: the theory of generalized conversational implicature.Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    When we speak, we mean more than we say. In this book Stephen C. Levinson explains some general processes that underlie presumptions in communication.
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  • (6 other versions)Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson (ed.), The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
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  • Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately.Colin F. Camerer - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):157-158.
    Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.
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  • (6 other versions)Logic and conversation.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - In Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 41-58.
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  • Language and Equilibrium.Prashant Parikh - 2010 - MIT Press.
    In Language and Equilibrium, Prashant Parikh offers a new account of meaning for natural language. He argues that equilibrium, or balance among multiple interacting forces, is a key attribute of language and meaning and shows how to derive the meaning of an utterance from first principles by modeling it as a system of interdependent games.His account results in a novel view of semantics and pragmatics and describes how both may be integrated with syntax. It considers many aspects of meaning--including literal (...)
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  • Be brief and vague! And how bidirectional optimality theory allows for verbosity and precision.Manfred Krifka - manuscript
    Given the beginnings of the United States of America, its sympathy with the French revolution and its rationalist attitude towards the institutions of society, one would have expected that it would have been one of the first nations to adopt the new metric system that was introduced in France in 1800. But the history of the attempts to do so is decidedly mixed. American Congress authorized the use of the metric system in 1866. In 1959, American measurements were defined in (...)
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  • Optimal assertions, and what they implicate. A uniform game theoretic approach.Anton Benz & Robert van Rooij - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):63-78.
    To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...)
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  • Signalling games select horn strategies.Robert van Rooy - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527.
    In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
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  • Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games.Michael Franke & Gerhard Jäger - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (1):117-139.
    We reopen the investigation into the formal and conceptual relationship between bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner in J Semant 15(2):115–162, 1998 , J Semant 17(3):189–216, 2000 ) and game theory. Unlike a likeminded previous endeavor by Dekker and van Rooij (J Semant 17:217–242, 2000 ), we consider signaling games not strategic games, and seek to ground bidirectional optimization once in a model of rational step-by-step reasoning and once in a model of reinforcement learning. We give sufficient conditions for equivalence of bidirectional (...)
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  • Some notes on the formal properties of bidirectional optimality theory.Gerhard Jäger - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (4):427-451.
    In this paper, we discuss some formal properties of the model ofbidirectional Optimality Theory that was developed inBlutner (2000). We investigate the conditions under whichbidirectional optimization is a well-defined notion, and we give aconceptually simpler reformulation of Blutner's definition. In thesecond part of the paper, we show that bidirectional optimization can bemodeled by means of finite state techniques. There we rely heavily onthe related work of Frank and Satta (1998) about unidirectionaloptimization.
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  • Some aspects of optimality in natural language interpretation.Blutner Reinhard - 2000 - Journal of Semantics 17 (3).
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