It appears to have been established that it is not possible for us to harm distant future generations by failing to adopt long-range welfare policies which would conserve resources or limit pollution. By exploring a number of possible worlds, the present article shows, first, that the argument appears to be at least as telling against Aristotelian, rights-based and Rawlsian approaches as it seems to be against utilitarianism, but second, and most importantly, that it only holds if we fail to view (...) moral agents as individuals. The article also concludes that the argument has profoundly counter-intuitive implications. (shrink)

Alan Carter correctly argues that Thomas Schwartz's 'future persons paradox' applies with equal force to utilitarianism, rights theory and Aristotelian ethics. His criticism of Rawls's 'justice between generations' is less successful, because of his failure (and perhaps Rawls's as well) to fully appreciate the hypothetical nature of the 'original position'. Carter's attempt to refute Schwartz's argument by focusing on the individuality of moral action fails, since it evades the essential point of Schwartz's argument. The best response to Schwartz is to (...) concede the essential validity of his argument and then to turn that argument into an ad absurdum refutation of his central premise,'the person affecting principle'. (shrink)

I argue that bioethics needs to focus less exclusively on our character as rational choice-making sentient beings, and take more into account our character and interests as living beings of the sort we are, of which our consciousness is but one aspect I propose that we adopt what I deem a biocentric ethic, centring on our nature and character as living human beings. As I develop them, the central biocentric conceptions are as follows: A living being is best thought of (...) not as a thing but as a living system, an ongoing life-process of a particular sort.Our interests as living beings spring from our particular character and lie in whatever contributes to our coherent effective functioning as ongoing life processes of that character.Our interests encompass our whole being, and not just our character as sentient, conscious, rational, decision-making beings.I argue that such conceptions can help us deal with matters of bioethical concern, including issues of euthanasia, abortion, autonomy, and perhaps genetic engineering. (shrink)