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  1. The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.
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  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.Marc H. Bornstein - 1980 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (2):203-206.
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  • Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents.Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin & Thomas Zoega Ramsoy - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.Jakub Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:149261.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...)
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  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
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  • Precis of Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
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  • The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.
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  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Consciousness: A Four-fold taxonomy.J. Jonkisz - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...)
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  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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  • The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?Jakob Hohwy - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):428-438.
    It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...)
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  • Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  • The empirical basis of color perception.R. Beau Lotto & Dale Purves - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.
    Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of (...)
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  • A thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    When are psychologists entitled to call a certain theoretical construct "consciousness?" Over the past few decades cognitive psychologists have reintroduced almost the entire conceptual vocabulary of common sense psychology, but now in a way that is tied explicitly to reliable empirical observations, and to compelling and increasingly adequate theoretical models. Nevertheless, until the past few years most cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists avoided dealing with consciousness. Today there is an increasing willingness to do so. But is "consciousness" different from other theoretical (...)
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  • The information integration theory of consciousness.Giulio Tononi - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 287--299.
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  • A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux - 2001 - Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.
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  • A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
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  • Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience.Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
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  • Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
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  • Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2004 - MIT Press.
    How the various things that are said to have meaning—purpose, natural signs, linguistic signs, perceptions, and thoughts—are related to one another.
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  • Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...)
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  • The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are (...)
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  • On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
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  • Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  • Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
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  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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  • Consciousness.John R. Searle - 2000 - Intellectica 31:85-110.
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  • The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  • Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
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  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?Giulio Tononi & Christof Koch - 2015 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370 (1668):20140167.
    The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like (...)
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  • Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.
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  • The biological function of consciousness.Brian Earl - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:69428.
    This research is an investigation of whether consciousness—one's ongoing experience—influences one's behavior and, if so, how. Analysis of the components, structure, properties, and temporal sequences of consciousness has established that, (1) contrary to one's intuitive understanding, consciousness does not have an active, executive role in determining behavior; (2) consciousness does have a biological function; and (3) consciousness is solely information in various forms. Consciousness is associated with a flexible response mechanism (FRM) for decision-making, planning, and generally responding in nonautomatic ways. (...)
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  • The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • Science & Philosophy: What Hard Problem?Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Philosophy Now 99:25-25.
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  • Consciousness: Theoretical approaches.Tim Bayne & Jakob Hohwy - unknown
    After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the second half of this entry (the (...)
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  • The self as phenotype.Philippe Rochat - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):109-119.
    Self-awareness is viewed here as the phenotypic expression of an interaction between genes and the environment. Brain and behavioral development of fetuses and newborn infants are a rich source of information regarding what might constitute minimal self-awareness. Research indicates that newborns have feeling experience. Unlike automata, they do not just sense and respond to proximal stimulations. In light of the explosive brain growth that takes place inside and outside of the womb, first signs of feeling as opposed to sensing experience (...)
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  • Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science.Andreas K. Engel, Alexander Maye, Martin Kurthen & Peter König - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):202-209.
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  • How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  • Unconscious auditory information can prime visual word processing: A process-dissociation procedure study☆.Dominique Lamy, Liad Mudrik & Leon Y. Deouell - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):688-698.
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  • Expertise and the evolution of consciousness.Matt J. Rossano - 2003 - Cognition 89 (3):207-236.
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  • The minimally conscious state: Defining the borders of consciousness.Joseph T. Giacino - 2005 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology. Elsevier.
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  • Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self.Bernard J. Baars - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):211-17.
    The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass.
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  • Consciousness, free action and the brain.John R. Searle - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.
    Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.
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