Semiotic objections to markets urge us not to place a good on the market because of the message that doing so would send. Brennan and Jaworski reject them on the grounds that either the contingent semiotics of a market can be changed or the weakness of semiotic reasons allows them to be ignored. The scope of their argument neglects the impure semiotic objections that claim that the message a market sends causes, constitutes, or involves a nonsemiotic wrong. These are the (...) most compelling class of semiotic objections and are the kind actually advanced in the literature. Rather than focusing on the necessity or contingency of a market's semiotics, we should instead attend to a semiotic objection's most important feature: its purity or impurity. (shrink)

Semiotic objections to commodification hold that buying and selling certain goods and services is wrong because of what market exchange communicates or because it violates the meaning of certain goods, services, and relationships. We argue that such objections fail. The meaning of markets and of money is a contingent, socially constructed fact. Cultures often impute meaning to markets in harmful, socially destructive, or costly ways. Rather than semiotic objections giving us reason to judge certain markets as immoral, the usefulness of (...) certain markets gives us reason to judge certain semiotic codes as immoral. (shrink)

Proponents of semiotic arguments against the commodification of certain goods face the following challenge: formulate your argument such that it does not appeal to immoral consequences, nor is really an argument showing that we ought to reform the meaning we give to commodification. I here attempt to meet this challenge via appeal to the notion of what I call proto-on-a-par value. Under this construal, the semiotic argument yields that the commodification of certain goods necessarily signals value choice, where value choice (...) ought not to be signaled. (shrink)

Critics of commodification often claim that the buying and selling of some good communicates disrespect or some other inappropriate attitude. Such semiotic critiques have been leveled against markets in sex, pornography, kidneys, surrogacy, blood, and many other things. Brennan and Jaworski (2015a) have recently argued that all such objections fail. They claim that the meaning of a market transaction is a highly contingent, socially constructed fact. If allowing a market for one of these goods can improve the supply, access or (...) quality of the good, then instead of banning the market on semiotic grounds, they urge that we should revise our semiotics. In this reply, I isolate a part of the meaning of a market transaction that is not socially constructed: our market exchanges always express preferences. I then show how cogent semiotic critiques of some markets can be constructed on the basis of this fact. (shrink)

This paper begins by consider a straightforward question in the metaphysics and morality of markets: Are there cases in which it is morally permissible to freely give x (i.e. without exchange for valuable consideration), but impermissible to give x in exchange for valuable consideration? To address this question, this paper raises the issue of the difference between giving freely and giving in exchange for valuable consideration. It argues that the distinction lies in whether the receipt of valuable consideration acts as (...) a reason for the giver. If S receiving some valuable consideration for x is not a reason for S to give x, then x is not engaging in an exchange. This illuminates the discussion around the morality of markets. Instead of supposing that x transforms when it is exchanged (rather than given), the difference can be assessed in terms of the giver’s reasons. As such, S freely giving x may be morally permissible and S exchanging x impermissible if S taking a valuable consideration as a reason makes the act wrong. The paper illustrates this with cases where individuals may give x only for certain reasons, and therefore are not permitted to exchange x. Finally, the paper concludes with an analysis of how this approach to analyzing exchange can contribute to the discussion of the metaphysics of markets, and create a fine-grained analysis of the different varieties of impermissible exchanges in terms of the moral analyses we do for other acts; it connects the discussion of the morality of giving and exchanging some x to the morality of other actions, and giving their permissibility in terms of justificatory reasons, consequences, etc. In doing so, the paper represents a contribution to the broader discussion of the morality of markets by illustrating a way to develop an analysis of the morality of exchanges (an important constituent of markets). This analysis circumvents approaches in the metaphysics of markets that have raised skepticism, e.g. certain goods transform when placed on a market. While compatible with claims about transformative goods, this theory allows for an explanation of moral prohibitions against certain kinds of exchange only on the basis of the justificatory reasons of the agents involved in the exchange; this is a much more stable metaphysical base from which to evaluate the morality of markets and exchanges. (shrink)

We sometimes have reasons to perform actions due to what they would communicate. Those who have discussed such reasons have understood what an action ‘communicates’ as what it conventionally expresses. Brennan and Jaworski argue that when a convention ensures that expressing the appropriate thing would be costly, we should change or flout the convention. I argue that what really matters is often what attitudes we indicate rather than conventionally express, using social science to show that indicating our attitudes is often (...) unavoidably costly, and sometimes worth the cost. I use this account to defend communicative arguments for egalitarian distributive policies. (shrink)

In several works, Jason Brennan and Peter Martin Jaworski defend the following thesis: If it is permissible to have, use, or exchange something for free, then it is permissible to have, use, or exchange that thing for money. In this paper, I argue that No Limits is false. Moreover, the reasons why it is false reflect many of the complaints made against markets. The paper will proceed as follows: In §1, I summarize Brennan and Jaworski’s position to clarify exactly what (...) a challenge to No Limits requires. In §2, I raise just such a challenge, one which also captures the concern behind some “semiotic objections.” In §3, I offer a modification to No Limits that avoids my objection but, as a result, re-opens the question of whether markets in some of the goods Brennan and Jaworski discuss are permissible. I conclude in §4 by considering a possible response and some thoughts on the dialectic as it stands. (shrink)