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  1. The Politics of Motivation.James N. Druckman - 2012 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 24 (2):199-216.
    Taber and Lodge offer a powerful case for the prevalence of directional reasoning that aims not at truth, but at the vindication of prior opinions. Taber and Lodge's results have far-reaching implications for empirical scholarship and normative theory; indeed, the very citizens often seen as performing “best” on tests of political knowledge, sophistication, and ideological constraint appear to be the ones who are the most susceptible to directional reasoning. However, Taber and Lodge's study, while internally beyond reproach, may substantially overstate (...)
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  • A model of heuristic judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
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  • (4 other versions)The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.
    “Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...)
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  • Value in Ethics and Economics.Paul Seabright - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):303.
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  • Laws of cognition and the cognition of law.Dan M. Kahan - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):56-60.
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