SummaryThe Bohr‐Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism and phenomenalism . An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to (...) widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme‐logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality. (shrink)

An attempt is made to give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The central point is that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, but nonetheless complete. The principal difficulty in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with external existence of the space—time continuum of classical physics.