I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any (...) exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. (shrink)

The very idea of human resource management raises ethical considerations: What does it mean to us as humans for human beings to be managed as resources? Intriguingly, the field of ethics and HRM remains underdeveloped. Current approaches to HRM fail to place ethical considerations as their central warrant. This article, building on Greenwood (J Bus Ethics 36(3):261–279, 2002), argues for a deeper analysis of ethical issues in HRM, indeed for a differentiated ethical perspective of HRM that sets normative deliberations as (...) its prime task. By identifying a distinct ethical approach to HRM that is unashamedly normative and socio-politically embedded, two objectives can be achieved. First, mainstream and critical approaches will be challenged to take ethical issues in HRM more seriously. Second, a dedicated forward-looking research agenda for the ethical analysis of HRM will be advanced. (shrink)

A language of care and relationship-building has recently appeared with prominence in the business literature, driven by the realities of the marketplace. Thus, it seems a propitious time to reflect on a decade of writing in feminist morality that has focussed on the concept of an ethic of care, and examine its relevance for today's business context. Is the idea of creating organizations that “care” just another management fad that subverts the essential integrity of concepts of ethical caring? Conversely, are (...) these concepts capable of beginning an important dialogue that may help us to see new possibilities for simultaneously enhancingboththe effectiveness and the moral quality of organizations in the future? (shrink)

In attempting to improve ethical decision-making in business organizations, researchers have developed models of ethical decision-making processes. Most of these models do not include a role for law in ethical decision-making, or if law is mentioned, it is set as a boundary constraint, exogenous to the decision process. However, many decision models in business ethics are based on cognitive moral development theory, in which the law is thought to be the external referent of individuals at the level of cognitive development (...) that most people have achieved. Other theoretical bases of ethical decision models, social learning, and experientialism, also imply a role for law that is rarely made explicit. Law is a more important aspect of ethical decision-process models than it appears to be in the models. This paper will derive explicit roles for the law from the cognition, experientialism, and social learning theories that are used to build ethical decision-making models for business behavior. (shrink)

Investigations into ethical judgments generally seem fuzzy as to the relevant research domain. We first attempted to clarify the construct and determine domain parameters. This attempt required addressing difficulties associated with pinpointing relevant literature, most notably the varied nomenclature used to refer to ethical judgments (individual evaluations of actions’ ethicality). Given this variation in construct nomenclature and the difficulties it presented in identifying pertinent focal studies, we elected to focus on research that cited papers featuring prominent and often-used measures of (...) ethical judgments (primarily, but not exclusively, the Multidimensional Ethics Scale). Our review of these studies indicated a preponderance of inferences and conclusions unwarranted by empirical evidence (likely attributable at least partly to inconsistent nomenclature). Moreover, ethical judgments related consistently to few respondent characteristics or any other variables, emergent relationships may not always be especially meaningful, and much research seems inclined to repetition of already verified findings. Although we concluded that knowledge about ethical judgments seems not to have advanced appreciably after decades of investigation, we suggested a possible path forward that focuses on the content of what is actually being judged as reflected in the myriad of vignettes used in the literature to elicit judgments. (shrink)

I argue that Plato was right in claiming that justice is more profitable, more rational, and more intrinsically valuable than injustice, and that this is particularly true for business organizations. The research on prisoners’ dilemmas and social dilemmas shows that ethical behavior is more profitable and more rational than unethical behavior in terms of both the negative sanctions on unethical behavior when interactions with stakeholders are iterated, and the positive rewards of habitually ethical behavior when stakeholders can identify those who (...) are predisposed to be ethical. In addition, the psychological research on justice shows that justice is intrinsically valued, both from an outcome and from a process perspective, and so crucial for business organizations, particularly in terms of organizational effectiveness. (shrink)

I argue that Plato was right in claiming that justice is more profitable, more rational, and more intrinsically valuable than injustice, and that this is particularly true for business organizations. The research on prisoners’ dilemmas and social dilemmas shows that ethical behavior is more profitable and more rational than unethical behavior in terms of both the negative sanctions on unethical behavior when interactions with stakeholders are iterated, and the positive rewards of habitually ethical behavior when stakeholders can identify those who (...) are predisposed to be ethical. In addition, the psychological research on justice shows that justice is intrinsically valued, both from an outcome and from a process perspective, and so crucial for business organizations, particularly in terms of organizational effectiveness. (shrink)