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  1. Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices.Simon Gächter, Eric J. Johnson & Andreas Herrmann - 2021 - Theory and Decision 92 (3):599-624.
    Loss aversion can occur in riskless and risky choices. We present novel evidence on both in a non-student sample (660 randomly selected customers of a car manufacturer). We measure loss aversion in riskless choice in endowment effect experiments within and between subjects and find similar levels of average loss aversion in both. The subjects of the within study also participate in a simple lottery choice task which arguably measures loss aversion in risky choices. We find substantial heterogeneity in both measures (...)
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  • New paradoxes of risky decision making.Michael H. Birnbaum - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (2):463-501.
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  • Weighing risk and uncertainty.Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (2):269-283.
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  • On the Composition of Risk Preference and Belief.Peter P. Wakker - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (1):236-241.
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  • Interpersonal comparisons of utility for 2 of 3 types of people.R. Duncan Luce - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):5-24.
    This article argues that there is a natural solution to carry out interpersonal comparisons of utility when the theory of gambles is supplemented with a group operation of joint receipts. If so, three types of people can exist, and the two types having multiplicative representations of joint receipt have, in contrast to most utility theories, absolute scales of utility. This makes possible, at least in principle, meaningful interpersonal comparisons of utility with desirable properties, thus resolving a long standing philosophical problem (...)
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  • Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena.William M. Goldstein & Hillel J. Einhorn - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (2):236-254.
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  • Cognitive models of risky choice: Parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory.Andreas Glöckner & Thorsten Pachur - 2012 - Cognition 123 (1):21-32.
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  • Subjective probability and decision strategy.Lee R. Beach & James A. Wise - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1p1):133.
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  • Measuring the time stability of Prospect Theory preferences.Stefan Zeisberger, Dennis Vrecko & Thomas Langer - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (3):359-386.
    Prospect Theory (PT) is widely regarded as the most promising descriptive model for decision making under uncertainty. Various tests have corroborated the validity of the characteristic fourfold pattern of risk attitudes implied by the combination of probability weighting and value transformation. But is it also safe to assume stable PT preferences at the individual level? This is not only an empirical but also a conceptual question. Measuring the stability of preferences in a multi-parameter decision model such as PT is far (...)
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  • Reference-dependent risk sensitivity as rational inference.Jerker C. Denrell - 2015 - Psychological Review 122 (3):461-484.
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  • Transitivity of preferences.Michel Regenwetter, Jason Dana & Clintin P. Davis-Stober - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):42-56.
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  • The role of cognitive abilities in decisions from experience: Age differences emerge as a function of choice set size.Renato Frey, Rui Mata & Ralph Hertwig - 2015 - Cognition 142 (C):60-80.
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  • Uncertainty plus prior equals rational bias: An intuitive Bayesian probability weighting function.John Fennell & Roland Baddeley - 2012 - Psychological Review 119 (4):878-887.
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